

Project Management Advisory Panels

An idea whose time has come!

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Now that modern professional project management has gained the attention of corporate and governmental leaders, I believe it is now time to take program and project governance to the next higher level. In recent years we have seen the emergence of enterprise project management; program and portfolio management; strategic project management; and organizational, program and project management maturity models.

In the wake of corporate governance scandals in the USA, we have also seen project management principles and techniques held out as means to improve program, project and organizational governance. Today I want to propose another approach for promoting better project management – the use of high level project management advisory panels.

Over the last 15 years, I have grown convinced that the use of high level “strategic” project management advisory teams could significantly improve performance on large public and privately financed projects. This is especially true for what are often referred to as “mega-projects”, those that cost more than US\$1B, for example, span several years and often involve hundreds of participating organizations. But I also believe that major public programs, multi-national projects and important global initiatives could significantly benefit from this approach.

Some Personal Background

In the Spring of 1989, I moved to North Texas as a member of the mobilization team for the startup of the Superconducting Super Collider (SSC) project. To create a new high energy physics laboratory for the US Department of Energy (DOE), the SSC was one of the largest public science projects in US history, with an original cost estimate of approximately \$7.5B and eight year schedule. It was also a very visible project, with its own line item in the US government’s annual budget, and a highly visible public competition among US states for the location.

The SSC was an exciting project to be associated with. Upon selection of the Texas site, some of the world’s leading scientists, engineers and constructors were assembled, all with high local visibility in the press and among local politicians. Nobel laureate physicists visited and participated in planning meetings; some of the world’s leading scientists participated on engineering and science planning committees. Senator Phil Gramm of Texas was a frequent visitor; US President George Walker Bush came to visit. Unfortunately, because of that size and visibility, the project also had its

political detractors, and the project sponsors were forced to defend the budget every year in Congress. By 1992, when the cost estimate had grown to over \$10B and completion schedule to over 10 years, the opposition in the US congress grew as well. Unbelievably to those of us working on the project, it was cancelled by vote in the US congress. By the time shut down was completed several years later, expenditures had reached in excess of \$2.5B.

The SSC project was cancelled on the basis of cost growth and mismanagement. Frankly speaking, I can attest to the fact that the SSC project was poorly managed. For example, I was personally responsible for developing an earned value based project cost and schedule control system for the entire project, in essence a fully integrated project management information system. Yet, when I questioned the logic and basis for the work breakdown structure (WBS), I was personally told by the deputy director that the WBS was none of my business. I was absolutely shocked, since that was a violation of the most basic principles of project management. (I was told, by the way, that the WBS was the responsibility of the cost estimating manager and CFO). Obviously, it was a challenging environment for implementing good PM.

At the highest levels of the new SSC Laboratory, two important committees were formed: a Science Advisory Committee composed of some of the world's leading high energy physicists; and a Tunnel Technology Committee, consisting of globally-recognized experts with experience associated with large tunneling projects and technologies. These committees reviewed progress on the project, asked questions at the highest levels, and provided feedback and recommendations to the executives and government officials overseeing the project. These committees were effective and were a very good idea. But I remember wondering at the time, why isn't there a similar high level Project Management Committee?

As it turned out, I am convinced that such a committee might have saved the SSC project from cancellation. That particular project was cancelled primarily due to poor external stakeholder management, a concept and process well established in the project management profession. And yet the entire issue was downplayed, not well managed, and not successful. In addition, I remember little if any risk management during the project planning process, and little if any reporting on risk mitigation measures on a regular basis.

At about the same time, during the late 1980s and early 1990s, two other highly visible mega-projects were being proposed in Texas. The first was the International Space Station, to be based at the Johnson Space Center in Houston. With a multi-billion dollar price tag, this project was also subject to major public visibility and congressional scrutiny.

The second large project was a proposed high-speed train line to connect the largest Texas cities: Austin, Dallas, Houston and San Antonio. It too had a multi-billion \$ price tag. As we know, the space station was approved and the high-speed rail was not.

While mismanagement was not a factor during the financing decisions on those projects, it occurred to me at the time that these mega-projects all shared some common characteristics.

During the dozen or so years prior to coming to Texas, I had the opportunity to work on several other very large projects, including the loss-of-fluid-test (LOFT) project in Idaho, the Idaho Environmental Restoration Program, and the Space Reactor Program, all major projects financed by the US DOE. In the late 1990s, I had the opportunity to work on two very large transit programs, in Dallas and Seattle, both with ten year “build-out” budgets exceeding US\$1B. The Sound Move Program in Seattle, involving regional transit improvements including light rail, commuter rail and highway projects, was a ten-year, \$2.5B program easily classified as a “mega” project. In all of these cases, I saw many of the same issues, problems and mistakes.

Over the last twenty years, I have seen and studied a wide variety of large projects, including multi-national programs, and seldom if ever have I seen enough high level executive attention focused on project management. (There have been a few exceptions, of course, for example among global contractor companies such as a Bechtel (USA), JGC (Japan), Siemens (Germany), ABB (Swedish/Swiss), IBM (USA), Lockheed Martin (USA), etc.) Today that is starting to change, but slowly.

The Common Mistake

The largest and most common mistake on many large programs and projects, in my opinion, is the delegation of project management to lower levels of the organization. In some cases, there is an unmistakable arrogance among top executives that they only need to worry about finances, politics and public image. What they don't seem to realize is that financial performance, public perceptions and political support all usually hinge on the progress and performance of the project team. And these are directly related to project management. Doesn't it make sense that the first and primary issue on any “project” must be “project management”?

In some cases, the organization is creating a new facility and senior executives are so anxious to start “production” that they immediately form a functional operating organization, delegating the project management matters to a “project team” or project “division”. This is exactly what occurred on the SSC. While the operations experts and managers are an important part of the project team, there will be no operations until the project is completed. Therefore, it is project management that should and must drive the project.

Current trends lead to more enlightened executives

Trends in the project management profession and industry in recent years are changing attitudes in executive suites worldwide. This is especially true in high technology

industries, and for organizations with significant investments in information technology products and systems. The rise of enterprise PM, project management offices, project management maturity models, and project portfolio management have all given rise to a much higher profile for project managers and project management.

More organizations and executives recognize the importance of successful project management when significant capital or company financial performance are invested in or dependent on projects. This higher profile, and popularity, of project management has been reflected in the phenomenal growth of interest in project management certifications, education, standards and professional activities. For example, the growth of the membership of the Project Management Institute (PMI®) from 50,000 to over 250,000 members worldwide in less than 10 years is a direct reflection of these trends, with little sight of slowing.

These trends have also led to a growing industry for project management services, software and technologies. The project management industry can now be estimated at several billion \$ and growing rapidly, on a global basis.

Project & Program Governance

In the last five years, I have seen a number of project management concepts promoted for improving corporate governance. Use of earned value management (EVM), for example, can help ensure better project performance and status reporting. Implementation of EPM, PMO or PPM methodologies and systems can improve the overall organizational performance for multiple projects and project-oriented enterprises.

But what about oversight of large programs and projects? How can performance on major projects be improved or the probability of success increased? Large projects are notorious for exceeding budgets and schedules, especially if the project involves high technology. Just last week, the cost estimate for the London 2012 Olympics, for example, has apparently tripled to near £10B. Consider the history of the Big Dig project in Boston, or most other mega projects funded by taxpayers and governments. How can project failures be reduced, especially on large projects?

Just as governance and oversight have become serious and important issues for public companies, the same issues should be applied on large projects, especially those funded with public funds. Standards should be required and applied. Accurate reporting required. Qualified project management professionals and suppliers employed. And there should be appropriate oversight.

A Suggested Solution - Project Management Advisory Panels

For corporate governance of public companies in the USA, board-level committees are now common. Those committees review and oversee such issues as employment &

compensation, financial reporting and auditing; corporate ethics and public reporting; and other topics. Now I would like to suggest that for major programs and projects, a **“Project Management Advisory Panel”**, board, committee or council be considered as a simple but effective mechanism for reducing performance risks. Such a panel should report to the program manager or higher level executive, and in some cases to a board of directors.

Many of the project management experts and leaders that I know personally, and especially those who have many years of experience, can very quickly identify key success or risk factors related to project management. For example, I would bet that any one of the global advisors for PMForum could ask a few questions on nearly any type of major project and quickly identify potential risks and steps to reduce those risks, possible cost and schedule improvements, contracting suggestions, communication issues or other ways to otherwise increase the probability of project success.

Any such committee or panel should include participants familiar with the technology or industry of the project as well as general project management experts. The charter for such a team could be quite limited, for example periodic meetings to review or discuss certain project management issues, or more formal and extensive. For large programs and projects, the return on such a small investment would be significant, in my opinion.

Candidate Programs and Projects for PM Advisory Panels

It seems logical to me that large complex programs and projects should be obvious candidates for project management oversight or advisory panels. But so should programs or projects of a strategic nature, or associated with mission-critical initiatives, enterprise survival – critical actions, or globally-important issues.

I suggest the following as candidates for advisory panels:

- Mega-projects (those with budgets exceeding \$1B);
- Major projects financed with public funds;
- Programs & projects associated with national or global security;
- Large complex projects involving untested or complicated technologies;
- Enterprise “mission-critical” projects and programs;
- Programs and projects addressing global problems, especially those involving multiple countries and governmental funding;
- Major projects funded by multi-lateral funding agencies; and
- Many other projects and programs of strategic importance to sponsors.

Project-oriented businesses might also consider this approach, perhaps even reporting to the board of directors or CEO.

Possible Benefits

The potential benefits of using a strategic level project management advisory panel could include the following:

- Better project planning;
- Lower project completion risks;
- Lower overall project costs;
- Earlier completion;
- Higher quality;
- More confident project management team;
- Increased executive confidence;
- Higher public acceptance & credibility;
- Increased probability of overall success.

These are not insignificant benefits, and each one can easily be translated into financial terms. The cost of implementing such an approach would probably be minimal, compared with overall project budgets.

Conclusion

While most of this article has focused on examples of large programs where better PM was needed, I want to mention some examples of good and effective programs. The Federal Transit Administration (FTA) within the US Department of Transportation (DoT) has a very effective Project Management Oversight (PMO) Program whereby qualified contractors are hired to ensure that federal project management requirements are satisfied on major projects involving federal funds. This is a great program, in my opinion, but not without some weaknesses. The Federal Highway Administration within DoT has a similar program, the Federal Aviation Agency is implanting earned value across the agency, and it is my understanding that broad improvements are underway throughout DoT.

The US Department of Energy (DOE) has taken significant steps in recent years to embrace project management best practices. Other agencies within the US federal government are making similar improvements, partially in response to pressure from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for better capital budgeting and performance based reporting. Similar initiatives are underway in Australia, Canada, India, Japan and the UK, that I am aware of, and probably many other countries. The European Commission has also gotten more serious recently in requiring project management qualifications and standards on major projects funded by the EU.

Nevertheless, I think that the use of a Project Management Advisory Panel could be very useful for many programs, projects and organizations. To me, it seems to be another idea whose time has come!

About the Author



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David L. Pells is Managing Editor of the *PM World Journal*, a global eJournal for program and project management, and Executive Director of the PM World Library. He is also the president and CEO of PM World, the virtual organization behind the journal and library, and of PM World Services, an executive P/PM advisory firm. David is an internationally recognized leader in the field of professional project management with more than 35 years of experience on a wide variety of programs and projects, including engineering, construction, defense, energy, transit, high technology, and nuclear security, and project sizes ranging from several thousand to ten billion dollars. He has been an active professional leader in the United States since the 1980s, serving on the board of directors of the Project Management Institute (PMI®) twice. David was awarded PMI's Person of the Year award in 1998 and Fellow Award in 1999. He is an Honorary Fellow of the Association for Project Management (APM) in the UK; Project Management Associates (PMA - India); and of the Russian Project Management Association SOVNET. From June 2006 until March 2012, he was the managing editor of the globally acclaimed *PM World Today* eJournal. David has published widely, speaks at conferences and events worldwide, and can be contacted at editor@pmworldjournal.net.