PM World Journal (ISSN: 2330-4480)
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

Post-War Project Management and the Multi-Stakeholder Approach: A Comparative Analysis of Rwanda and Bosnia and Herzegovina[1]

Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE

MESOS Business School (France)
GBSB Global Business School (Malta)
CEREGE Research Laboratory – University of Poitiers (France)

Abstract

Post-conflict reconstruction takes place in complex, high-stakes environments where diverse stakeholders, including national governments, international donors, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), local communities, and private sector actors must work together to rebuild the physical, institutional, and social foundations of societies emerging from war. This paper examines how a multi-stakeholder approach can be effectively leveraged in such contexts by integrating theoretical insights from project management, public management, and operations management. Drawing on both a synthesis of the existing literature and an original comparative case analysis of Rwanda and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the study explores how coordination, stakeholder inclusion, and adaptive management influence reconstruction outcomes. Rwanda's post-genocide recovery was characterized by strong national ownership, centralized coordination through structures such as Single Project Implementation Units (SPIUs), and integrated community participation, facilitating policy coherence and operational efficiency. Bosnia and Herzegovina, by contrast, faced deep political fragmentation in the aftermath of civil war and relied heavily on international actors – through mechanisms like donor conferences and sector task forces to manage and implement reconstruction initiatives. The analysis demonstrates that while both countries achieved significant infrastructure recovery and service restoration, their divergent approaches reveal that multi-stakeholder frameworks must be tailored to specific political, institutional, and operational conditions. The findings underscore that coordination is not optional but foundational; that balancing national leadership with inclusive participation is critical for legitimacy and sustainability; and that operational tools from logistics and process management enhance project delivery. Ultimately, the study concludes that post-conflict reconstruction is not merely a technical challenge but a complex governance endeavor. Multi-stakeholder collaboration when guided by clear leadership, inclusive structures, and adaptive processes can align diverse interests, mitigate conflict risks, and lay the groundwork for lasting peace and development. The lessons drawn from Rwanda and Bosnia are relevant to other post-conflict contexts and contribute to a broader understanding of effective project management in fragile states.

---

[1] How to cite this work: Harake, M. F. (2025). Post-War Project Management and the Multi-Stakeholder Approach : A Comparative Analysis of Rwanda and Bosnia and Herzegovina, *PM World Journal*, Vol. XIV, Issue VII, July.

PM World Journal (ISSN: 2330-4480)
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

Key Words: Post-conflict reconstruction; project management; multi-stakeholder partnerships; public management; operations management; stakeholder coordination.

1. Introduction

1.1. Overview

Post-conflict reconstruction represents a profoundly complex and multidimensional endeavor that transcends the mere physical rebuilding of war-torn infrastructure. It entails the comprehensive reconstitution of state capacity, including the restoration of legitimate and effective governance structures, the re-establishment of the rule of law, the delivery of essential public services, and the stimulation of economic revitalization (Brinkerhoff, 2005; Call, 2008). In the aftermath of violent conflict, both national governments and affected populations are often left grappling with urgent humanitarian and developmental needs amidst conditions marked by acute political instability, social fragmentation, and persistent security threats (Paris, 2004; Del Castillo, 2008).

In response to these challenges, the international community comprising bilateral aid agencies, multilateral financial institutions, United Nations bodies, international non-governmental organizations, and increasingly, private sector stakeholders typically mobilizes substantial financial and technical resources to facilitate recovery and stabilization (Barnett et *al*., 2007; Del Castillo, 2008). This influx of external assistance, while vital, gives rise to a crowded and often fragmented operational environment, where coordination among diverse actors becomes a central concern (Colleta et *al.,* 1998; Feinstein International Center, 2006). As such, the management of reconstruction efforts in post-conflict settings diverges significantly from conventional development paradigms, necessitating adaptive, context-sensitive approaches that are attuned to the fluid dynamics of political transitions and societal recovery (Chandler, 2006; Mac Ginty, 2011).

As Sakalasuriya et *al.,* (2016) note, a significant number of countries have either undergone or are currently engaged in post-conflict reconstruction processes, with aggregate investments amounting to several hundreds of billions of dollars across critical sectors including infrastructure, public health, education, judicial reform, and democratic institution-building. Within these settings, the prompt and effective delivery of tangible results is not merely a technical imperative, but a political necessity, one that plays a pivotal role in restoring public trust, enhancing state legitimacy, and laying the foundational conditions for sustainable peace and development (Brinkerhoff, 2007; Paris & Sisk, 2009). The ability to demonstrate early ''peace dividends'' is often crucial in mitigating relapse into violence and in consolidating fragile transitions (United Nations, 2004).

PM World *Journal* *(ISSN: 2330-4480)*
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

Figure 01. Post-Conflict Reconstruction: A Multi-Stakeholder Project Management Framework

1.2. Multi-Stakeholder Complexity

A defining feature of post-conflict reconstruction is its intrinsically multi-stakeholder character. Unlike projects executed within the controlled environments of the private sector or single-agency bureaucracies, post-war reconstruction unfolds within a dense and pluralistic ecosystem. This ecosystem typically comprises a wide spectrum of actors, including national and subnational government ministries, bilateral and multilateral donors, international financial institutions, United Nations agencies, international and local non-governmental organizations (NGOs), community-based organizations, and, in certain contexts, military peacekeeping forces or private sector contractors (Pugh, 2000; The World Bank, 2003; Barnett, 2012). Each of these actors brings distinct mandates, priorities, institutional cultures, and modes of operation to the reconstruction space, making coordination and coherence particularly challenging (Chesterman, 2004; Mac Ginty, 2011).

The coordination and alignment of such a diverse set of stakeholders around a coherent and unified reconstruction agenda presents both substantial opportunities and formidable challenges. On the positive side, inclusive multi-stakeholder coalitions are capable of mobilizing

*PM World **Journal*** *(ISSN: 2330-4480)*
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

a more extensive pool of financial resources, technical competencies, and political capital than any single actor could command independently (OECD, 2008; Barnett, 2012). This collective capacity enhances the potential to address the deeply interconnected political, economic, and social drivers of violent conflict (Collier et *al.*, 2003; World Bank, 2011). Moreover, multi-stakeholder frameworks are increasingly recognized in both policy and scholarly discourse as crucial for ensuring that reconstruction processes are not merely technocratic exercises in rebuilding infrastructure, but holistic interventions aimed at fostering social reconciliation, institutional legitimacy, and long-term peacebuilding (Paris & Sisk, 2009; Mac Ginty, 2011).

However, the very heterogeneity that defines these environments can also give rise to significant coordination challenges. The involvement of numerous actors often leads to elevated transaction costs, bureaucratic redundancies, and competition over visibility or influence (Colleta et *al.,* 1998; OECD, 2008). Fragmentation may manifest in duplicated efforts, service delivery gaps, or incoherent programming across sectors and regions (The World Bank, 1998). Conflicting strategic objectives, whether between international donors and national governments, or among agencies with divergent ideological or operational approaches can further exacerbate inefficiencies and diminish collective impact (Curtis, 2001; Barnett, 2012). In the absence of robust coordination mechanisms, the result may be a proliferation of isolated interventions that, while producing discrete outputs, fail to contribute meaningfully to the overarching goals of sustainable recovery and transformative peace (Paris & Sisk, 2009; Mac Ginty, 2011). In worst-case scenarios, uncoordinated or politically insensitive interventions may actively undermine one another or exacerbate existing tensions, thereby jeopardizing the fragile gains of post-conflict transitions (Pouligny, 2006; Autesserre, 2010).

Figure 02. Multi-Stakeholder Dynamics in Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Opportunities and Coordination Challenges

PM World *Journal* (ISSN: 2330-4480)
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

1.3. The Need for an Integrated Approach

This paper advances the argument that effective project management in post-conflict reconstruction contexts necessitates an integrated, interdisciplinary approach – one that draws upon the complementary insights of project management, public management, and operations management. Each of these domains offers critical frameworks and tools for addressing the multifaceted challenges encountered in post-war environments, where urgency, institutional fragility, and high stakeholder complexity converge (Kettl, 2002; Brinkerhoff, 2005; Ika, 2012). Project management contributes structured methodologies for planning, monitoring, and risk mitigation under conditions of uncertainty (Turner, 1999), while public management emphasizes adaptive governance, accountability, and institutional capacity-building (Grindle, 1997). Meanwhile, operations management provides analytical models and logistical strategies essential for ensuring efficient service delivery and resource allocation in highly constrained and dynamic environments (Chopra & Sodhi, 2004).

From a project management perspective, the application of structured methodologies, such as results-based management, logical frameworks, and agile or adaptive planning techniques is essential for the systematic planning, execution, and monitoring of reconstruction initiatives. These tools are particularly valuable under conditions of heightened uncertainty, where timelines are compressed and strategic objectives must be frequently reassessed in response to evolving ground realities (Crawford & Bryce, 2003; Ika, 2012). Results-based management facilitates a clear articulation of goals, outcomes, and performance indicators, enabling greater accountability and focus (Focus International, 2000). Logical frameworks provide a structured means of mapping causal relationships between inputs, activities, and intended impacts, while agile and adaptive approaches introduce flexibility and iterative learning, especially critical in volatile post-conflict contexts where rigid plans often falter (Ramalingam et *al.*, 2014; Conforto et *al.*, 2014).

A public management and governance lens underscores the importance of aligning externally funded interventions with national development strategies, ensuring coherence between international assistance and domestic priorities. This alignment not only enhances the effectiveness of aid delivery but also contributes to the legitimacy and sustainability of reconstruction efforts by reinforcing national ownership and institutional capacity (Brinkerhoff, 2007; OECD, 2011). Strengthening core state functions, promoting transparency, and fostering inclusive participation are essential for consolidating peace and avoiding dependency on external actors (Grindle, 1997; Chesterman, 2004). Without this alignment, international aid risks undermining local institutions, distorting accountability mechanisms, and creating parallel structures that weaken the long-term viability of state-led governance (Paris & Sisk, 2009; Booth, 2012).

Meanwhile, an operations management perspective highlights the critical role of process efficiency, supply chain coordination, and resource optimization in environments often characterized by damaged infrastructure, disrupted markets, and acute capacity constraints (Van Wassenhove, 2006; Kovács & Spens, 2007). Effective logistics, procurement systems, and service

delivery mechanisms are indispensable for ensuring that reconstruction inputs are converted into tangible outcomes in a timely and cost-effective manner (Tomasini & Van Wassenhove, 2009). In post-conflict settings, where uncertainty and volatility are the norm, operations management tools help streamline workflows, mitigate bottlenecks, and adapt supply chains to local conditions, thereby enhancing the overall impact and sustainability of recovery efforts (Beamon & Balcik, 2008).

By synthesizing these disciplinary perspectives, practitioners and policymakers are better equipped to design and implement reconstruction programs that are not only technically sound but also politically legitimate and operationally feasible (Brinkerhoff, 2008; Ika & Donnelly, 2017). Such an integrated approach is crucial in post-conflict settings, where reconstruction must proceed at speed while remaining inclusive and responsive to the long-term imperatives of peacebuilding and state formation (Chesterman, 2004; Paris & Sisk, 2009). Bridging project management, public governance, and operations management enables the formulation of interventions that are context-sensitive, institutionally embedded, and capable of navigating the volatility and complexity inherent in post-conflict environments (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013).

Figure 03. Multidisciplinary Framework for Post-Conflict Project Management

PM World Journal (ISSN: 2330-4480)
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

1.4. Structure of the Research

The structure of this paper is organized to guide the reader through a comprehensive exploration of post-conflict project management within multi-stakeholder environments. The research begins with a literature review, which surveys key theoretical frameworks and empirical studies related to post-conflict reconstruction, project management in fragile settings, and multi-stakeholder coordination. This section identifies foundational concepts and synthesizes lessons drawn from existing research, providing the analytical grounding for the study.

Following the literature review, the methodology section outlines the study's research design, which is based on a comparative case analysis of Rwanda and Bosnia and Herzegovina. These two cases have been purposefully selected due to their markedly different post-conflict reconstruction trajectories, offering a valuable basis for examining how varying stakeholder configurations and governance models shape reconstruction outcomes.

The next section presents the case studies in depth, detailing the institutional arrangements, stakeholder dynamics, management strategies, and project-level outcomes in each national context. This empirical foundation supports the subsequent analysis and discussion, which undertakes a comparative evaluation of the two cases. Here, the research identifies cross-cutting themes, such as coordination mechanisms, local ownership, and operational effectiveness—while also examining how contextual factors, including political settlement and institutional capacity, influence the effectiveness of multi-stakeholder approaches.

The paper concludes with a synthesis of key findings and offers practical and policy-oriented recommendations for improving post-conflict project management. Emphasis is placed on the critical importance of inclusive, well-coordinated, and adaptive reconstruction strategies as prerequisites for promoting durable peace, institutional resilience, and sustainable recovery in post-conflict societies.

PM World *Journal* *(ISSN: 2330-4480)*
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

Figure 04. Structure of the paper: A Comparative Framework for Post-Conflict Project Management

2. Literature Review

2.1. Project Management in Post-Conflict Environments

Conventional project management frameworks provide a foundational structure for organizing tasks and managing resources; however, their direct application in post-conflict environments requires substantial adaptation. Conflict-affected settings are characterized by heightened levels of uncertainty, risk, and urgency, all of which influence each phase of the project life cycle (Ika, 2012; Sakalasuriya et *al.,* 2016). A key distinguishing factor is the critical importance of time. In such contexts, there is acute pressure to deliver rapid, visible outcomes, often referred to as ''quick wins'', to stabilize societies and address basic human needs (Barakat & Waldman, 2013).

PM World Journal (ISSN: 2330-4480)
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

Unlike standard projects, which may permit extended periods of initiation and planning, post-conflict interventions frequently operate on accelerated timelines. Planning and implementation phases often overlap to expedite the restoration of essential services such as water, electricity, and healthcare, as well as to provide employment for demobilized combatants and returning refugees (World Bank, 1998; Brinkerhoff, 2007). The imperative for speed stems not only from humanitarian considerations but also from the necessity to reinforce the legitimacy of nascent governments or recently brokered peace agreements. As illustrated by a World Bank evaluation, the early success of the reconstruction program in Bosnia and Herzegovina was partly attributed to the rapid preparation and execution of emergency projects, which delivered immediate, tangible benefits and signaled a ''peace dividend'' to affected communities (World Bank, 1998).

Another salient feature of project management in post-conflict settings is the expanded and politically sensitive configuration of stakeholders. In stable environments, stakeholders typically include the client, project sponsor, implementers, and end-users. In contrast, post-conflict projects must accommodate a broader and more complex array of actors. These may include international donors who often function as both clients and sponsors – transitional or fragile government institutions as partners and beneficiaries, ethnically or regionally diverse populations, and a multiplicity of implementing organizations spanning various sectors and geographies (Brinkerhoff, 2005; Ika & Donnelly, 2017). Sakalasuriya et *al.,* (2016) conceptualize this dynamic through the ''iron triangle'' of post-conflict project stakeholders: donors (who finance and often condition the projects), government counterparts (at national or local levels), and the project delivery teams (commonly international contractors or NGOs).


Figure 05. The ''iron triangle'' of post-conflict project stakeholders

PM World *Journal* (ISSN: 2330-4480)
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

Managing expectations and relationships among these actors is highly delicate, as projects operate under intense scrutiny and bear substantial political and social weight (Chesterman, 2004; Barnett, 2012). Perceptions of exclusion or imbalance, such as local communities viewing a project as donor-imposed, or donors doubting government accountability can jeopardize implementation. Furthermore, residual mistrust among stakeholders, often rooted in recent conflict, exacerbates coordination challenges (Autesserre, 2010). Consequently, effective stakeholder engagement is paramount. Successful project managers must exhibit strong communication and facilitation skills, promoting transparency, inclusive participation, and shared ownership from the outset (Crawford & Bryce, 2003; Pouligny, 2006).

The scope and objectives of post-conflict reconstruction projects frequently extend beyond those of conventional development initiatives. These projects not only aim to restore physical assets but also seek to rebuild social cohesion and institutional capacity (Brinkerhoff, 2007; Barakat & Waldman, 2013). As such, the traditional project success metrics (cost, time, and scope) are insufficient on their own. For example, a project to rebuild a school in a war-affected area cannot be evaluated solely on budgetary and scheduling performance; its effectiveness also hinges on its contribution to restoring access to education and rebuilding trust in public service delivery (Crawford & Bryce, 2003; Ika, 2012). Accordingly, project management in post-conflict contexts must incorporate conflict-sensitive approaches and expand the criteria for evaluating success. Some scholars advocate for the adoption of ''Build Back Better'' principles, which emphasize resilience, inclusivity, and the rectification of structural drivers of conflict (United Nations Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery, 2006). This might involve constructing infrastructure to higher standards or integrating peacebuilding components – such as involving members of previously opposing groups in joint labor efforts into project activities (Mac Ginty, 2011). Project managers must therefore balance the tension between delivering immediate, tangible outcomes and fostering long-term capacity building and conflict mitigation (Paris & Sisk, 2009).

Risk management in post-conflict reconstruction also requires an enhanced and context-sensitive approach. In addition to standard risks such as budget overruns and technical delays, projects must contend with threats of renewed violence, physical insecurity for personnel, endemic corruption, and fluid political conditions (Kapucu & Van Wart, 2006; World Bank, 2011). Tools such as scenario analysis, contingency planning, and adaptive budgeting are essential in these settings. For instance, procurement plans may need to include alternative supply routes to circumvent areas vulnerable to instability (Chopra & Sodhi, 2004). Flexibility is a critical design feature, and the capacity to revise plans in response to emerging developments is indispensable. International NGOs engaged in reconstruction must resist the inclination to impose rigid, pre-formulated interventions; instead, they must embrace adaptive planning processes consistent with agile project management principles (Conforto et *al.,* 2016). Such an approach allows organizations to respond effectively to the volatile and rapidly changing dynamics typical of post-conflict environments (Ramalingam et *al.,* 2014).

PM World Journal (ISSN: 2330-4480)
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

Figure 06. Adapting Project Management Frameworks for Post-Conflict Reconstruction

2.2. Public Management and Multi-Stakeholder Governance

From a public management perspective, post-conflict reconstruction constitutes a critical test of governance capacity and inter-organizational coordination. In the aftermath of conflict, public sector institutions are frequently weakened, characterized by collapsed administrative structures, depleted human capital, and diminished public trust (Grindle, 2004; Brinkerhoff, 2005). Simultaneously, the donor community often mobilizes extensive aid programs, introducing substantial external resources and actors into the domestic governance landscape (Chesterman, 2004; OECD, 2011). A central challenge in this context is aligning international assistance with national priorities. When effectively managed, such alignment can contribute to strengthening state institutions and enhancing governmental legitimacy (Paris & Sisk, 2009; Brinkerhoff, 2010). Conversely, poorly coordinated or excessively donor-driven interventions risk marginalizing emerging public institutions and generating ambiguity in lines of accountability (Booth, 2012; Barnett, 2012). Consequently, the importance of national ownership and coordinated aid frameworks has become a central theme in the public management literature on post-conflict reconstruction (OECD, 2008; UNDP, 2009).

To address these governance challenges, coordination mechanisms are frequently established to harmonize efforts between domestic authorities and international actors. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, for instance, the late 1990s reconstruction program was structured around national reconstruction plans developed in collaboration with key international stakeholders including the World Bank and the European Commission and endorsed by the national government (World Bank, 1998; Paris, 2004). In Rwanda, following the 1994 genocide, the

PM World *Journal* (ISSN: 2330-4480)
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

government implemented formal coordination structures, including sector-wide approaches and the Single Project Implementation Unit (SPIU) model, to ensure alignment between donor-funded projects and national development priorities, while promoting implementation coherence (Hayman, 2009; Booth & Golooba-Mutebi, 2012). These mechanisms aimed to enhance national ownership, reduce project fragmentation, and strengthen state capacity by integrating aid delivery into centralized and accountable public management systems. Such institutional arrangements exemplify how post-conflict states can assert leadership over reconstruction processes, even while dependent on substantial external support.

A central organizing concept within this domain is the multi-stakeholder partnership, which in public management denotes collaborative arrangements involving both state and non-state actors in decision-making and implementation processes. Within post-conflict settings, such approaches are widely promoted. The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA, 2008), for example, advocates for inclusive models that incorporate multilateral and bilateral donors, international and local non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and civil society actors, while maintaining legitimacy through national ownership and community participation. This inclusive paradigm is supported by both pragmatic and normative justifications: pragmatically, post-conflict governments often lack the capacity to deliver services independently and therefore benefit from partnerships that mobilize external resources (Brinkerhoff, 2002; Barnett, 2012); normatively, the involvement of civil society fosters transparency, accountability, and reconciliation by enabling citizens to participate in the reconstruction of their own communities (Mac Ginty, 2011; Istrefi, 2017). These partnerships not only expand institutional reach but also contribute to rebuilding trust between citizens and state institutions, a critical dimension of peacebuilding and democratic governance.

Nonetheless, scholarly critiques caution against overly idealized portrayals of multi-stakeholder collaboration. Structural power asymmetries are frequently evident donors, as primary funders, may exert disproportionate influence over agendas, while host governments may use coordination platforms to marginalize dissenting voices (Mosse, 2005; Istrefi, 2017). Genuine participation entails more than symbolic inclusion; it requires mechanisms that enable local stakeholders to exert substantive influence over planning and implementation (Hickey & Mohan, 2004; Cornwall, 2008). Rwanda offers an illustrative example of assertive government leadership in managing donor relations. The government emphasized a principle of strategic autonomy, encapsulated in the dictum *"don't tell us what to do; help us do what we want to do"* thereby maintaining control over development priorities while accepting external support (Hayman, 2009; Booth & Golooba-Mutebi, 2012). Although this approach facilitated alignment with national objectives, it also reflected a centralized and directive governance style. At the local level, Rwanda employed community-based mechanisms such as gacaca courts and Umuganda (monthly public service activities), which fostered citizen participation in reconstruction and reconciliation, albeit under strong state oversight (Clark, 2010; Purdekova, 2011).

In contrast, Bosnia and Herzegovina's post-conflict governance context was marked by institutional fragmentation along ethnic lines, which significantly constrained national-level coordination (Chandler, 2000; Paris, 2004). As a result, international actors, including the Office

PM World Journal (ISSN: 2330-4480)

Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025

www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management

by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE

Featured Paper

of the High Representative (OHR) and various United Nations agencies, assumed leading roles in orchestrating reconstruction efforts. While these arrangements were intended to compensate for weak domestic governance capacity, they often produced tensions. For example, NGOs in Bosnia criticized major donors such as the World Bank for prioritizing macroeconomic reforms and espousing participatory rhetoric that was not matched by meaningful local empowerment (Donais, 2005; Pugh, 2005). In this case, multi-stakeholder coordination was heavily internationalized, and the limited involvement of domestic actors in decision-making sometimes undermined legitimacy and long-term sustainability. This experience highlights the risks of externally dominated reconstruction, where international control, though expedient in the short term may marginalize local voices and hinder state-building in the long run (Caplan, 2005; Donais, 2005).

A further dimension of public management in post-conflict reconstruction pertains to building domestic implementation capacity. While donors can provide funding and technical assistance, the overarching objective is to develop robust and self-sustaining local institutions (Brinkerhoff, 2007; UNDP, 2009). Accordingly, many reconstruction projects incorporate capacity-building components, such as training civil servants, establishing new administrative bodies (e.g. housing authorities or peace commissions), and fostering institutional learning (Grindle, 2004). The World Bank's assessment of its post-conflict interventions in Bosnia and Herzegovina acknowledged the positive contributions of early reconstruction projects to local implementation capacity and the empowerment of domestic authorities (World Bank, 1998). Similarly, Rwanda's institutionalization of centralized implementation units within line ministries, Single Project Implementation Units (SPIUs), initiated in 2011, reflects a deliberate effort to integrate donor project management into state structures (Booth & Golooba-Mutebi, 2012). This approach sought to reduce reliance on parallel NGO systems, improve coordination, and equip public officials with the skills necessary to manage complex projects independently (Hayman, 2009; Whitfield, 2008). Building such capacity is essential not only for ensuring operational effectiveness but also for reinforcing state legitimacy and long-term sustainability.

PM World *Journal* (ISSN: 2330-4480)
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

Figure 07. Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Public Management Dimensions and Stakeholder Coordination

2.3.   Operations Management and Implementation Challenges

Operations management concerns the effective and efficient execution of complex processes, a perspective that holds significant relevance in the context of post-conflict reconstruction. In environments devastated by conflict, operational challenges are ubiquitous: critical infrastructure such as roads, bridges, and power grids may be damaged or destroyed; supply chains are often disrupted or unreliable; skilled labor and construction materials may be in short supply; and security risks can impede progress or necessitate military escorts for transport and project teams (Van Wassenhove, 2006; Kovács & Spens, 2007). Within such settings, applying operations management principles entails devising adaptive strategies to deliver goods and services under highly constrained conditions. This includes scenario planning, logistics network reconfiguration, just-in-time supply adjustments, and contingency procurement systems that ensure continuity despite volatility (Chopra & Sodhi, 2004; Tomasini & Van Wassenhove, 2009). In post-conflict settings, success often hinges not on perfect efficiency, but on resilience, redundancy, and the ability to pivot rapidly in response to unpredictable developments (Beamon & Balcik, 2008).

A foundational principle of operations management coordination to eliminate waste and redundancy is particularly pertinent in post-conflict contexts. This principle aligns with lean management approaches, which seek to reduce inefficiencies, and with supply chain integration strategies that aim to streamline complex workflows (Womack & Jones, 2003). Experts underscored the importance of coordination and data exchange in post-conflict environments to prevent duplication and resource misallocation: to avoid project duplication and waste in all its forms (e.g. time, money, etc.) (Simchi-Levi et *al.*, 2008). In operational terms, this may involve

PM World Journal *(ISSN: 2330-4480)*
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

the development of shared information platforms through which non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and aid agencies log their activities by geographic location (Kovács & Spens, 2007). Such systems help prevent situations where, for instance, two organizations inadvertently rebuild schools in the same village while another remains neglected. Moreover, information-sharing mechanisms and cross-agency coordination protocols not only enhance efficiency but also support equitable service delivery and strategic resource allocation, which are critical in fragile and resource-scarce environments (Van Wassenhove, 2006; Tomasini & Van Wassenhove, 2009).

Coordination also encompasses logistical planning, including scheduling the transport of materials to maximize efficiency and standardizing designs and procurement to realize economies of scale (Van Wassenhove, 2006; Simchi-Levi et *al.*, 2008). In the aftermath of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, poor coordination led to duplication in service delivery for example, multiple health NGOs concentrated on the same diseases in one region while other pressing health needs were neglected (Hayman, 2009; Booth & Golooba-Mutebi, 2012). In response, the government employed information and communication technology (ICT) tools to enhance data sharing and established the Single Project Implementation Unit (SPIU) model to centralize and harmonize donor-funded projects within line ministries, reducing overlap and improving accountability. Similarly, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the creation of sector-specific task forces under international leadership improved intra-sector coordination particularly in areas such as housing and water supply by facilitating a clearer division of labor among donors and implementing agencies (World Bank, 1998; Paris, 2004). These examples illustrate how targeted coordination mechanisms, both technological and institutional, are essential for overcoming fragmentation and enhancing the operational effectiveness of post-conflict reconstruction efforts.

Resource allocation under uncertainty constitutes another major operational concern. Post-conflict projects often proceed with limited or unreliable information regarding population needs, available funding, or on-the-ground conditions (Van Wassenhove, 2006; Beamon & Balcik, 2008). While multi-stakeholder needs assessments can provide more comprehensive data, they cannot eliminate volatility. Flexible resource management mechanisms, such as the use of contingency funds that can be reallocated as priorities shift during implementation—are thus vital for responsiveness (Chopra & Sodhi, 2004). One illustrative case is Bosnia's early housing reconstruction efforts, where resources were misallocated to beneficiaries who ultimately did not return to their homes, resulting in unoccupied, though reconstructed, properties (World Bank, 1998; Paris, 2004). This failure reflected inadequate targeting and poor data utilization. In response, international actors established the Housing Verification and Monitoring Unit (HVMU), which collected detailed data on tens of thousands of homes and occupants to identify issues such as double occupancy and to ensure aid reached intended recipients. This approach exemplifies operations management principles related to performance monitoring, feedback loops, and data-informed decision-making (Tomasini & Van Wassenhove, 2009).

PM World Journal (ISSN: 2330-4480)
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

Supply chain management is similarly critical in post-conflict contexts, where reconstruction efforts often depend on the importation and internal distribution of materials such as cement, steel, and construction equipment across damaged or insecure transport networks (Van Wassenhove, 2006; Kovács & Tatham, 2010). The efficiency of procurement and logistics processes can significantly affect project timelines and outcomes. Evidence from peacekeeping and humanitarian operations suggests that streamlined procurement procedures and decentralized authority can accelerate project delivery in the field (Tomasini & Van Wassenhove, 2009; Apte, 2010). The World Bank's evaluations of emergency reconstruction in Uganda and Bosnia commended the use of expedited procurement processes and dedicated emergency protocols that reduced bureaucratic delays (World Bank, 1998; 2003). Additionally, operational strategies such as establishing regional supply depots and enhancing warehousing and distribution capabilities proved essential in supporting complex operations. For example, the United Nations' integrated missions established centralized logistics hubs that served multiple reconstruction initiatives simultaneously (United Nations, 2008).

Quality and sustainability are further key dimensions that must be integrated into operational planning. In the urgency to deliver visible results, there is often a temptation to adopt expedient solutions such as temporary shelters that may not withstand environmental or social pressures (Barakat & Zyck, 2009). An operations management lens would advocate for embedding quality assurance and maintainability into the design and execution of projects. Multi-stakeholder collaboration can enhance this by reconciling diverse priorities: engineering professionals may focus on technical standards, NGOs may prioritize community engagement and training, and government actors may emphasize local sourcing to stimulate economic activity (Mac Ginty, 2011; Beamon & Balcik, 2008). Aligning these objectives requires integrated planning processes. In Bosnia, linking housing reconstruction to economic recovery by ensuring that returnees had access to livelihoods was recognized as essential for sustainable reintegration. Technically completed homes were not deemed successful if they remained uninhabited due to unemployment or insecurity (Paris, 2004). This case underscores the value of an operations systems approach, which views the "product" of reconstruction not as isolated infrastructure but as the restoration of interconnected social, economic, and institutional systems (Oloruntoba & Gray, 2006).

PM World *Journal* (ISSN: 2330-4480)
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

Figure 08. Post-Conflict Reconstruction: An Operations Management Perspective

2.4.   What the Literature Provides

In summary, the existing literature underscores that effective post-conflict reconstruction is contingent upon the integration of three interdependent domains. First, the application of rigorous project management frameworks, tailored to the volatility and uncertainty inherent in high-risk environments is essential for planning, executing, and monitoring reconstruction initiatives (Ika, 2012; Crawford & Bryce, 2003). Second, collaborative public management practices are critical for coordinating the wide array of stakeholders involved, fostering inclusive governance, and reinforcing institutional legitimacy (Brinkerhoff, 2007; Paris & Sisk, 2009). Third, the strategic deployment of operations management principles including process optimization, data-informed decision-making, and resource efficiency enhances the capacity to deliver services and infrastructure under severe constraints (Van Wassenhove, 2006; Tomasini & Van Wassenhove, 2009). These domains do not operate in isolation; rather, their convergence forms the foundation for responsive, accountable, and durable reconstruction outcomes.

The following section details the methodological approach employed in this study to investigate how these three dimensions interacted and manifested within the post-conflict reconstruction trajectories of Rwanda and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

PM World Journal (ISSN: 2330-4480)
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

3. Methodology

3.1. Overview

This study employs a qualitative comparative case study methodology, focusing on two states that have undergone extensive post-conflict reconstruction: Rwanda and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The selection of these cases is purposive and guided by a logic of comparative variation, which seeks to illuminate how differing contextual conditions shape the dynamics and outcomes of multi-stakeholder project management in post-conflict settings (Berman, 2007; Gerring, 2007).

The cases have been deliberately chosen based on their contrast across several analytically significant dimensions. Geographically, they represent two distinct regions (Sub-Saharan Africa and the Balkans) each with unique historical, political, and socio-economic legacies. In terms of conflict termination, Rwanda's civil war concluded through a decisive military victory by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), resulting in a centralized government with strong control over the reconstruction agenda. In contrast, Bosnia and Herzegovina's war ended through the Dayton Peace Agreement, a negotiated settlement brokered under international auspices, which produced a power-sharing arrangement and a fragmented governance system, underpinned by sustained external oversight (Paris, 2004; Caplan, 2005).

The reconstruction approaches adopted in each context also diverge meaningfully. Rwanda pursued a centralized, state-led model characterized by strong governmental ownership and strategic alignment of donor efforts. Bosnia, by contrast, experienced a more externally driven and institutionally diffuse process, with international actors, most notably the Office of the High Representative (OHR) playing a dominant role in policy formulation and project implementation (Chandler, 2000; Donais, 2005).

By examining two cases with divergent post-conflict trajectories in different regional and institutional contexts, this study aims to generate insights that transcend cultural and geographic specificity. In doing so, it contributes to the development of more generalizable frameworks for understanding and improving multi-stakeholder project management in fragile and conflict-affected environments. The comparative approach facilitates a nuanced assessment of how governance structures, coordination mechanisms, and stakeholder configurations influence reconstruction outcomes, and offers evidence-based recommendations for designing more effective and inclusive recovery strategies (Blatter & Haverland, 2012).

PM World Journal (ISSN: 2330-4480)

Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025

www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management

by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE

Featured Paper

Figure 09. Methodological Approach: Comparative Case Study of Rwanda and Bosnia and Herzegovina

3.2.   Data Collection

Data for both case studies were collected through a comprehensive review of secondary sources, employing a document-based research strategy particularly well-suited to comparative analysis in post-conflict settings (Bowen, 2009; Yin, 2018). The data corpus encompassed a wide range of materials, including:

- Peer-reviewed academic literature,
- Project evaluation reports produced by bilateral and multilateral development agencies,
- Policy briefs and white papers from think tanks and policy research institutions,
- Official documents and strategic plans issued by national governments and international organizations, and
- Practitioner-oriented resources such as field manuals, operational guidelines, and conference proceedings.

Key sources included post-conflict reconstruction assessments conducted by the World Bank, the United Nations, and other international financial institutions; scholarly analyses of the reconstruction trajectories of Rwanda and Bosnia and Herzegovina; and reports and publications by non-governmental organizations and international policy networks directly involved in recovery processes in both countries.

PM World Journal *(ISSN: 2330-4480)*
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

The use of multiple and varied data sources enabled a robust process of triangulation, enhancing the credibility, reliability, and depth of the findings (Patton, 2002. Denzin, 2009). This methodological approach ensured that the analysis was informed by diverse perspectives (academic, institutional, and practitioner-based) thereby providing a comprehensive understanding of how project management, public administration, and operations management principles were operationalized in two contrasting post-conflict contexts.

Figure 10. Data Sources for Case Study Analysis in Post-Conflict Reconstruction Research

3.3.   Analytical Framework

The comparative analysis in this study was structured around six key dimensions of inquiry, each designed to capture a critical aspect of post-conflict reconstruction and multi-stakeholder project management. These dimensions served as analytical lenses for both within-case examination and cross-case synthesis, enabling a systematic yet context-sensitive approach to qualitative comparison (Berman, 2007; Blatter & Haverland, 2012).

- **Context and Stakeholders**: This dimension provides an overview of the post-conflict environment in each country, with particular attention to the historical, political, and institutional conditions that shaped the trajectory of reconstruction. It also maps the

PM World *Journal* (ISSN: 2330-4480)
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

constellation of stakeholders involved, including national government entities, bilateral and multilateral donors, international NGOs, local civil society actors, and, where applicable, military or peacekeeping forces.

- **Coordination Mechanisms**: This component assesses the institutional and procedural arrangements established to facilitate coordination among diverse actors. It analyzes formal mechanisms such as inter-agency committees, sectoral working groups, donor coordination units, and joint planning forums, with a focus on their structure, functionality, and effects on coherence and efficiency.
- **Project Management Strategies**: This area examines the planning, implementation, and monitoring methods employed in reconstruction efforts. Particular attention is given to the adaptation of project management methodologies, such as agile planning, risk management, and performance monitoring, to the volatility and constraints of post-conflict settings.
- **Public Management and Governance**: This dimension explores the role of national governments in leading and regulating the reconstruction process. It investigates the degree of alignment with national development strategies, the quality of engagement with international partners, and the extent of domestic institutional capacity and ownership.
- **Operational Challenges and Solutions**: This category identifies the logistical, infrastructural, and human resource constraints faced during implementation and evaluates the strategies adopted to mitigate them. It includes an analysis of innovations in procurement, coordination, and service delivery that emerged in response to operational complexity.
- **Outcomes and Sustainability**: This final dimension assesses the results of reconstruction initiatives across both short-term indicators (e.g. infrastructure rehabilitation, return of displaced persons, restoration of basic services) and long-term metrics (e.g., institutional resilience, governance reform, peace consolidation). It evaluates whether multi-stakeholder collaboration enhanced sustainability and effectiveness or introduced coordination burdens that limited impact.

For each case, a narrative synthesis was developed to integrate findings across these thematic categories, enabling a holistic portrayal of reconstruction dynamics. This was followed by a cross-case comparative analysis aimed at identifying patterns of convergence, such as recurring enablers of effective coordination or shared operational innovations, and points of divergence attributable to contextual factors, including governance architectures, donor engagement models, and conflict legacies.

The objective of this comparison is not to determine which national model was more successful, but rather to illuminate how different configurations of stakeholder coordination, project management practices, and public governance strategies shaped the process and outcomes of post-conflict reconstruction. This approach facilitates the development of analytically grounded and potentially generalizable insights to inform the design and execution of effective reconstruction interventions in other fragile and conflict-affected settings.

PM World Journal *(ISSN: 2330-4480)*
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

Thematic Framework for Case Study Analysis

Context and Stakeholders
Overview of the post-conflict environmert and
actors involved in reconstruction

Coordination Mechanisms
Institutional and procedural arrangements 9
for stakeholder coordination

Project Management Strategies
Planning and implementation of
reconstruction projects

Public Management and Governance
Government leadership and alignment
with development frameworks

Operational Challenges and Solutions
Logistical and implementation-related difficulties
and strategies

Outcomes and Sustainability
Short- and long-term reconstruction resits
and effectiveness

Cross-case comparative analysis

Figure 11. Thematic Framework for Case Study Analysis of Post-Conflict Reconstruction

## 3.4.   Methodological Limitations and Reflexivity

This research adopts a qualitative and interpretive approach, relying primarily on the analysis of existing documentation and retrospective accounts. The use of secondary data, while appropriate for comparative inquiry in post-conflict settings, introduces certain methodological limitations (Bowen, 2009; Yin, 2018). Chief among these is the potential for source bias: for example, official government reports may emphasize progress and policy success, whereas independent evaluations and critical policy analyses may foreground implementation challenges or contest official narratives. To mitigate this risk, the study employed a multi-perspectival strategy, drawing on a diverse range of materials produced by governments, international donors, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and academic researchers. This approach

enabled triangulation of information and contributed to a more balanced and nuanced interpretation of each case (Patton, 2002. Denzin, 2009).

It is acknowledged that the findings of this study are not statistically generalizable due to the non-random selection of cases and the qualitative nature of the data. However, the comparative case design enhances analytical rigor by facilitating the identification of theoretical patterns, contextual contrasts, and recurring dynamics across divergent post-conflict trajectories (Berman, 2007; Blatter & Haverland, 2012). This design supports context-sensitive inferences that contribute to theoretical development and conceptual refinement in the study of multi-stakeholder reconstruction.

Beyond its theoretical contributions, particularly the integration of insights from project management, public administration, and operations management—the study also aims to produce actionable knowledge for policymakers and practitioners. By distilling evidence-based lessons from two distinct post-conflict contexts, the research offers practical guidance on how to structure, coordinate, and manage complex reconstruction processes in fragile and conflict-affected environments.

Qualitative and Interpretive Approach

Draws on existing documentation and retrospective accounts, subject to secondary data limitations
Efforts were made to balance multiple viewpoints (donor, governmennt, NGO, academic, etc.)

Comparative Case Design

Enables theoretical and empirical contrasts for analytical robustnesss.

Aims to contribute both to theoretical understanding and practical knowledge.

Figure 12. Limitations and Contributions of the Research Approach

PM World Journal (ISSN: 2330-4480)
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

4. Case Study: Rwanda

4.1. Background and Stakeholder Environment in Rwanda

The 1994 genocide and civil war in Rwanda left the country physically devastated and socially fragmented. Over the course of approximately 100 days, an estimated 800,000 individuals, primarily Tutsis and moderate Hutus were systematically killed (Des Forges, 1999). The conflict concluded with the military victory of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a rebel army that subsequently formed the new government. The incoming RPF-led administration inherited a state in near-total collapse, facing immense challenges including widespread infrastructure destruction, the disintegration of public institutions, mass displacement, and a severe erosion of human capital. Immediate post-genocide efforts focused on emergency humanitarian relief, addressing critical issues such as cholera outbreaks, food insecurity, and refugee encampments. These were soon followed by medium and long-term reconstruction initiatives under the auspices of the new RPF-led government.

The post-conflict stakeholder landscape in Rwanda was both complex and evolving. The central actor was the Government of Rwanda, initially headed by President Pasteur Bizimungu and Vice President (later President) Paul Kagame. Despite assuming a leading role in reconstruction, the government was institutionally fragile: many civil servants had been killed or displaced, and the national treasury was depleted. Consequently, international actors assumed a dominant role in the initial reconstruction phase. These included bilateral donors (e.g. the United States, European states, Canada), multilateral organizations (notably the World Bank, UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR, the IMF, and the African Development Bank), and an extensive network of over 100 international NGOs (Hayman, 2009; Booth & Golooba-Mutebi, 2012). These stakeholders engaged in projects spanning sectors such as health, education, justice, housing, and governance reform. While the domestic private sector remained weak in the immediate aftermath, it gradually re-emerged through contracting roles. Rwandan NGOs and community-based organizations contributed significantly, particularly in reconciliation and housing reconstruction, thereby supporting the social dimensions of recovery.

Coordination during the immediate post-genocide period (1994–1995) was largely ad hoc and reactive. Given the urgency of humanitarian needs, numerous actors *''rushed in to fill the vacuum''* in service delivery (UNDESA, 2007). While this rapid mobilization was essential for immediate relief, it led to significant fragmentation and inefficiency. For instance, NGOs constructed schools and homes to varying standards, resulting in regional disparities. Some districts were overserved by overlapping interventions, while others remained neglected, underscoring the absence of a centralized coordination framework.

Recognizing the risks of uncoordinated aid, the Rwandan government sought to assert greater control over the reconstruction agenda. In 1998, it established the Central Public Investments and External Finance Bureau (CEPEX) to monitor donor-funded projects and manage the Public Investment Program. CEPEX was tasked with tracking implementation across geographic and

PM World Journal *(ISSN: 2330-4480)*
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

sectoral lines. However, due to limited capacity and technical expertise, it faced difficulties in fully mitigating project fragmentation (Brinkerhoff, 2007).

Between 2000 and 2005, Rwanda adopted a Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp), reflecting emerging global trends in aid coordination. Under this model, line ministries and development partners collaborated to jointly design and fund sectoral programs, particularly in health and education. Sector Working Groups (SWGs), typically chaired by line ministries and supported by donor representatives, replaced isolated project-level coordination with sectoral-level planning. The health sector, in particular, emerged as a model of strategic alignment and donor harmonization, though effectiveness varied across sectors (Hayman, 2009).

A major shift occurred following the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, which emphasized country ownership, alignment, and harmonization (OECD, 2005). In response, Rwanda adopted a formal Aid Policy in 2006, mandating that all external assistance align with the national Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS) and be coordinated through government-led mechanisms. This policy explicitly sought to reduce parallel implementation systems and strengthen national oversight.

Institutionalization of these principles took a significant step forward in 2011 with the introduction of Single Project Implementation Units (SPIUs) within each line ministry. Under this reform, ministries were required to consolidate previously fragmented project management structures into unified SPIUs responsible for overseeing all externally funded projects within their sectors. The SPIU model was designed to streamline administration, harmonize monitoring and reporting procedures, and align donor-financed activities with national priorities. It has since been recognized as a pioneering mechanism for reinforcing government leadership over reconstruction and development, contributing to Rwanda's broader strategy of reclaiming sovereignty and coordination capacity in the post-conflict recovery process (Whitfield, 2008; Booth & Golooba-Mutebi, 2012).

PM World Journal (ISSN: 2330-4480)
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

Figure 12 Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Stakeholder Coordination in Rwanda (1994–2011): From Fragmentation to Government-Led Integration

4.2. Background and Stakeholder Environment in Rwanda

As the Rwandan government progressively rebuilt institutional capacity and articulated a coherent national development agenda, most notably through strategic frameworks such as *Vision 2020*, reconstruction efforts became increasingly aligned with clearly defined national priorities. The post-conflict reconstruction model adopted by the Rwandan state was characterized by a dual strategy: a strong, centralized planning apparatus coupled with deliberate efforts to foster grassroots participation. This hybrid governance structure provided the foundation for the design and implementation of donor-supported projects and reflected the government's broader objective of reclaiming sovereignty over its development trajectory (Hayman, 2009; Booth & Golooba-Mutebi, 2012).

At the central level, Rwanda's post-genocide leadership—particularly the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) under the influence of President Paul Kagame—exercised tight control over policymaking and external engagement. The government emphasized administrative discipline among both domestic officials and international development partners, requiring that all donor-funded initiatives conform to national strategic frameworks and sectoral plans. Joint sector reviews were instituted as mechanisms to promote alignment, ensure accountability, and minimize duplication. The Rwandan state was notably assertive in rejecting donor interventions that were perceived as misaligned or externally driven. As one scholar observed, Rwanda welcomed international support only to the extent that it advanced the country's own objectives, rather than those of the donor community (Whitfield, 2008). This approach helped reduce inefficiencies and strengthen coherence—for example, rather than permitting multiple

PM World Journal (ISSN: 2330-4480)
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

NGOs to implement fragmented teacher training programs, the Ministry of Education consolidated efforts into a single, nationally standardized initiative.

Concurrently, the government recognized that local ownership and community participation were essential for the legitimacy and sustainability of reconstruction. This recognition was operationalized through the integration of community-based approaches into project design and execution. A prominent example is the *Imidugudu* program, a national resettlement initiative aimed at accommodating approximately three million returning refugees. The program promoted grouped village settlements to facilitate the efficient delivery of services such as education, water, and healthcare. Local communities contributed labor through traditional forms of collective work (*umuganda*), while the government and donor agencies provided materials, technical assistance, and oversight. The model required close collaboration between project managers, local leaders, and beneficiary committees, institutionalizing participatory mechanisms at the point of implementation (UNDESA, 2007; Ministère des Gouvernements Locaux, 2018).

The inclusion of civil society actors and beneficiaries at all stages of project planning and execution is critical to building legitimacy and ensuring effectiveness (Chemouni, 2014). Rwanda institutionalized this principle through its 2000 decentralization reform, which empowered local governments as the primary implementers of development programs. District administrations were tasked with planning and managing reconstruction efforts in collaboration with communities. Participatory governance structures such as elected district councils and community development committees facilitated bottom-up identification of needs and enabled local stakeholders to shape development priorities in their areas (Booth & Golooba-Mutebi, 2012).

From an operational standpoint, Rwanda faced the typical challenges encountered in post-conflict settings, including a shortage of skilled labor, weak domestic contracting capacity, and severely damaged infrastructure. In the immediate aftermath of the genocide, reconstruction contracts were often awarded to foreign firms or international NGOs. However, over time, both the government and development partners prioritized local capacity development, particularly in the construction and engineering sectors. This shift supported the emergence of Rwandan firms and consultancies, often operating through joint ventures with international partners. The growth of domestic capacity not only stimulated private sector development but also enhanced operational efficiency, as local firms were better equipped to navigate Rwanda's terrain, social context, and logistical constraints (Maresca, 2003).

Rwanda's geographic compactness further supported reconstruction logistics. Following the clearance and rehabilitation of major transport routes, the movement of materials and equipment became relatively efficient. In addition, military engineering units were deployed to assist with infrastructure rehabilitation especially in the repair of roads and bridges thereby augmenting national execution capacity at a time when civilian institutions were still recovering (Van Wassenhove, 2006).

A particularly notable example of Rwanda's integrated approach to central coordination, local participation, and operational execution is the *Ubudehe* program, launched in the early 2000s. This community-based initiative focused on poverty reduction through participatory planning and implementation. Local populations identified priority projects—such as agricultural terracing or water access improvements and implemented them using small grants drawn from a communal fund supported by pooled donor contributions. While managed through decentralized government structures, *Ubudehe* was fundamentally driven by grassroots decision-making, thus embodying principles of subsidiarity, ownership, and inclusiveness (Ministère des Gouvernements Locaux, 2018; UNDESA, 2007). The program also enabled donors to harmonize their support, reducing fragmentation and enhancing strategic coherence. Recognized for its innovative design and citizen engagement, *Ubudehe* received the United Nations Public Service Award in 2008, cementing its status as an exemplar of effective post-conflict reconstruction grounded in both centralized coordination and community empowerment.

Overall, Rwanda's approach demonstrates how post-conflict reconstruction can be strategically managed through a multi-level governance model that integrates national leadership, donor coordination, and local participation. By embedding project management within a broader system of state-building and social reconstruction, Rwanda was able to transform fragmented relief efforts into a more unified and sustainable development trajectory.

PM World Journal (ISSN: 2330-4480)
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

Figure 14. Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Rwanda: Integrating Central Coordination with Local Participation

4.3. Outcomes and Reflections on Rwanda's Approach

By most accounts, Rwanda's post-conflict reconstruction has yielded significant achievements in infrastructure development, public service restoration, and macroeconomic stabilization. Within a decade of the 1994 genocide, the country had rebuilt or rehabilitated thousands of schools and health centers, reestablished road networks across all provinces, and expanded access to clean water and healthcare services (Maresca, 2003; Hayman, 2009). These material improvements were accompanied by measurable gains in social indicators: child mortality declined, primary school enrollment rose, and poverty rates steadily decreased. During the 2000s, Rwanda's economy grew at an average annual rate of approximately 8%, positioning it among the fastest-growing economies in sub-Saharan Africa (IMF, 2012). These outcomes led many observers to characterize Rwanda as a "poster child" for post-conflict recovery and a potential exemplar of a new African developmental state (Booth & Golooba-Mutebi, 2012). While these successes were undeniably supported by sustained inflows of foreign aid estimated at 15–20% of GDP during much of the post-genocide period, Rwanda's strategic coordination and utilization of that aid stands out as a key differentiating factor.

PM World Journal (ISSN: 2330-4480)
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

From the perspective of multi-stakeholder project management, Rwanda's reconstruction experience produced several notable outcomes:

- **Improved Stakeholder Coordination**: The establishment and refinement of coordination mechanisms including Sector Working Groups (SWGs), the Central Public Investments and External Finance Bureau (CEPEX), and later the Single Project Implementation Units (SPIUs) contributed to a significant reduction in project duplication and donor fragmentation by the mid-2000s Increasingly, externally funded initiatives operated in a complementary rather than competitive manner. The health sector exemplified this evolution: under the leadership of the Ministry of Health, all major development partners aligned under a unified Health Sector Strategic Plan. The sectoral SPIU coordinated a wide-ranging portfolio, encompassing infrastructure development (e.g. hospital construction), workforce training (e.g. nursing education), and service delivery reforms.

- **Capacity Building and System Strengthening**: Rwanda's insistence on national ownership translated into active involvement of domestic institutions in project planning and implementation. Over time, this engagement contributed to substantial improvements in local administrative and technical capacity. Donor reliance on Rwanda's public financial management and accountability systems further reinforced domestic oversight mechanisms. The Office of the Auditor General and specialized anti-corruption bodies helped institutionalize transparency and reduce misappropriation—contributing to Rwanda's reputation for relatively low levels of corruption among post-conflict states (Transparency International, 2022). Moreover, Rwanda's often-quoted directive to *"help us do what we want to do"* encapsulated a broader policy orientation that emphasized alignment with nationally articulated priorities over externally imposed donor agendas (Whitfield, 2008).

- **Community Ownership and Participatory Implementation**: Government programs such as *Ubudehe* and *Imidugudu* exemplified deliberate efforts to foster grassroots participation. Local communities were not merely recipients of assistance, but active contributors—providing labor, engaging in decision-making, and helping to maintain physical infrastructure. This participatory model bolstered project sustainability and promoted reconciliation by facilitating cooperative action across ethnic and social lines. For instance, community-led water user committees were responsible for maintaining rural water systems, reinforcing both service longevity and local cohesion (UNDESA, 2007; Ministère des Gouvernements Locaux, 2018).

Despite these successes, several limitations warrant careful scrutiny. A prominent concern relates to the centralized nature of Rwanda's governance model. While centralization facilitated policy coherence and effective implementation, it also constrained civic space and limited the autonomy of non-state actors. Many observers have noted that civil society organizations and NGOs in Rwanda were expected to closely align with government priorities, often functioning more as implementing partners than as independent voices (Hayman, 2009; Gready, 2011). This dynamic raises critical questions about the authenticity of the multi-stakeholder framework: to

PM World *Journal* (ISSN: 2330-4480)
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

what extent did it reflect genuine collaboration, and to what extent was it shaped by the dominance of a powerful state apparatus?

Furthermore, Rwanda's continued dependence on external aid introduced strategic vulnerabilities. Although the government maintained a firm stance on aid alignment, it remained sensitive to international perceptions and geopolitical considerations. Periodic tensions between Rwanda and development partners such as the suspension of aid following allegations of Rwandan involvement in conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo highlight the fragility of aid-dependent development trajectories (Beswick, 2010). These episodes underscore the importance of diplomatic engagement and international credibility in maintaining the financial and political support necessary for sustained recovery.

In summary, Rwanda's post-conflict reconstruction experience offers valuable insights into the dynamics of centralized coordination, capacity building, and community participation within a multi-stakeholder framework. Its successes illustrate the potential of state-led reconstruction models to achieve rapid and visible gains. Yet, the Rwandan case also underscores the trade-offs between efficiency and inclusiveness, and between national sovereignty and donor dependency trade-offs that are likely to confront other fragile states navigating the complex path from conflict to recovery.

Improved Stakeholder Coordination
- Refined coordination mechanisms (sector working groups, SPIUs)
- Reduced duplication and enhanced complementarityf proje-cts

Capacity Building and System Strengthening
- Strengthened national administrative and technical capacities
- Enhanced accountability and reduced opportuni-ties for misuse of funds
- Aid aligned with national priorities

Community Ownership and Participatory Implementation
- Programs (e.g., Ubudehe) involving communities in reconstruction efforts
- Greater sustainability and social cohesion

Infrastructure development, improved service delivery, macroeconomic stabilization

Figure 15. Outcomes of Rwanda's Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Coordination, Capacity, and Community Participation

PM World *Journal* (ISSN: 2330-4480)
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

4.4. Summary

Rwanda's post-conflict reconstruction was characterized by a coherent national vision, the development of effective coordination mechanisms, and a strategic balance between centralized planning and grassroots engagement. These factors enabled the government to orchestrate a diverse array of domestic and international stakeholders within a relatively unified and purpose-driven reconstruction framework. The Rwandan case demonstrates that multi-stakeholder approaches can be highly effective when anchored in strong state leadership, supported by institutionalized coordination structures, and underpinned by a clear ethos of national ownership. While legitimate critiques remain—particularly concerning the high degree of centralization and the constrained civic space—Rwanda's experience nonetheless highlights the capacity of structured, government-led coordination to deliver tangible and sustainable outcomes in post-conflict settings.

By contrast, the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina presents a markedly different post-conflict landscape. Emerging from a protracted and ethnically driven conflict and governed under the terms of the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement, Bosnia's post-war reconstruction unfolded within a fragmented political settlement and a highly decentralized governance framework. The resulting national government possessed limited authority and institutional capacity, with power distributed along ethno-political lines and significant responsibilities delegated to subnational entities. In this context, external actors—particularly international organizations and bilateral and multilateral donors assumed a dominant and directive role in designing, financing, and implementing reconstruction activities. The following case study explores how these dynamics influenced multi-stakeholder coordination, project management strategies, and the overall trajectory of recovery in a complex and institutionally diffuse post-conflict setting.

PM World Journal (ISSN: 2330-4480)
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

5. Case Study: Bosnia and Herzegovina

5.1. Background and Stakeholder Environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), which lasted from 1992 to 1995, was a central and devastating chapter in the violent disintegration of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Marked by systematic ethnic cleansing, the war claimed the lives of over 100,000 people and displaced more than two million (Burg & Shoup, 1995; Toal & Dahlman, 2011). The hostilities resulted in large-scale destruction of housing, infrastructure, and the broader economic base of the country.

The conflict formally ended with the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in December 1995. While Dayton succeeded in halting violence, it also enshrined a complex and highly decentralized political architecture. Bosnia and Herzegovina was reconstituted as a single sovereign state composed of two semi-autonomous entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (predominantly Bosniak and Croat) and Republika Srpska (predominantly Serb), along with the self-governing Brčko District. Crucially, the Dayton Agreement established the Office of the High Representative (OHR), an international body mandated to oversee the civilian aspects of peace implementation. Backed by the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), a consortium of donor countries and international organizations, the OHR was granted far-reaching powers, including the ability to impose legislation, dismiss elected officials, and coordinate donor assistance (Chandler, 2000).

In the immediate aftermath of the war, Bosnia's domestic governance capacity was extremely limited. Wartime authorities continued to wield influence in their respective territories, often prioritizing ethnonational interests over national cooperation. Central institutions were fragile, newly formed, and widely distrusted by entity-level actors. In this vacuum, international organizations assumed a dominant role in orchestrating post-war reconstruction, including in policy formulation, financing, implementation, and coordination.

The stakeholder landscape in post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina was thus shaped primarily by international actors, with domestic institutions playing a limited and often fragmented role. Key stakeholders included:

- **Bosnian Government Authorities**: Operating at multiple levels, these included a weak national government, composed of a tripartite presidency and a rotating Council of Ministers, as well as the entity governments of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska. Within the Federation, further administrative complexity arose from the existence of ten cantonal governments. Power-sharing arrangements and deep-seated ethnic divisions rendered the state apparatus highly fragmented and often paralyzed by political stalemate (Belloni, 2001).
- **International Governance Institutions**: The OHR served as the central coordinator and enforcer of civilian peace implementation, exercising significant executive authority. The

PM World Journal (ISSN: 2330-4480)

Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025

www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management

by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE

Featured Paper

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) supported democratization processes, organized elections, and engaged in rule of law and governance programming.

- **Donor Governments and Financial Institutions**: Key actors included the World Bank, the European Commission, and bilateral donors such as the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Sweden, Canada, and Japan. These stakeholders not only provided financial assistance but often dictated priorities and programmatic directions (World Bank, 1997; Donais, 2005).
- **United Nations Agencies and International NGOs**: UN agencies, particularly UNHCR, UNDP, and UNICEF, played leading roles in refugee return, housing reconstruction, education, and health. International NGOs, many of which had operated during the conflict, transitioned into reconstruction and development roles, implementing donor-funded projects across various sectors.
- **Local Communities and Beneficiaries**: A substantial segment of Bosnia's population consisted of refugees and internally displaced persons, many of whom sought to return to their pre-war homes. These populations were direct beneficiaries of reconstruction programs but had limited formal influence in shaping project priorities.

Between 1996 and 1999, the international community maintained a highly directive role not only in providing financial support but also in establishing institutional frameworks, coordination mechanisms, and implementation strategies. The World Bank and European Commission led early needs assessments and coordinated donor mobilization efforts, organizing annual donor conferences in Brussels and Sarajevo. NATO-led peacekeeping missions (IFOR, later SFOR) provided the essential security backdrop for civilian reconstruction and occasionally assisted in logistical operations.

While Bosnia benefited from extensive international support and relatively sophisticated coordination structures, its reconstruction process was also marked by institutional fragmentation and limited national ownership. Compared to Rwanda, where strong state leadership directed donor alignment, Bosnia's governance framework rooted in the Dayton settlement hindered central coordination, fostered political gridlock, and complicated multi-stakeholder engagement. These dynamics profoundly shaped both the design and the effectiveness of post-conflict recovery initiatives in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

PM World Journal (ISSN: 2330-4480)

Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025

www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management

by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE

Featured Paper

Figure 16. Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Stakeholder Landscape and Governance Structure (1995–1999)

5.2. Coordination Mechanisms and Project Management in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Given Bosnia and Herzegovina's deeply fragmented political landscape following the 1992–1995 war, early reconstruction efforts were largely conceived, designed, and coordinated by international actors, with domestic engagement varying across entities and sectors. In early 1996, shortly after the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, the World Bank led a Joint Needs Assessment in collaboration with Bosnian experts. This assessment quantified reconstruction requirements across critical sectors and served as the foundation for a series of high-level donor conferences (World Bank, 1997). Co-chaired by the World Bank and the European Commission, and attended by Bosnian representatives, these conferences established a strategic coordination framework. This platform enabled donors to reach broad consensus on sectoral priorities, geographic distribution, and funding commitments, facilitating a balanced approach to reconstruction across both entities and between infrastructure, economic, and social domains.

PM World Journal (ISSN: 2330-4480)
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

At the operational level, coordination was further institutionalized through the creation of Sector Task Forces. Each major sector (i.e. transport, housing, energy, education, agriculture, health, etc.) was assigned a dedicated task force, typically co-chaired by a lead donor agency and a relevant Bosnian institution, where such structures existed. For instance, the Housing Sector Task Force, central to refugee return and reintegration, was co-led by the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), with participation from officials in both the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska. These forums aimed to align donor initiatives, avoid duplication, and promote coherence with overarching recovery goals (Donais, 2005).

In 1997, the OHR established the Reconstruction and Return Task Force (RRTF) to address the interdependent challenges of housing reconstruction and minority return. The RRTF operated local field offices, conducted needs assessments, and convened international stakeholders, NGOs, and local authorities to coordinate resources. Notably, the RRTF also held enforcement powers: where local officials obstructed property restitution or return processes, the OHR exercised its mandate to remove them from office, demonstrating the unique supervisory role of international actors over public management in post-conflict Bosnia (Chandler, 2000).

Given the limited administrative capacity of Bosnian institutions, early project implementation was largely managed through donor-led mechanisms. Many programs were executed directly by multilateral agencies or through centralized Project Implementation Units (PIUs), often staffed by international consultants. The World Bank frequently applied its ''Emergency Project'' model, which utilized streamlined procurement and rapid disbursement procedures to restore critical infrastructure, such as bridges, water systems, and schools—with speed and visible impact prioritized over longer-term institutional development (World Bank, 1997). In this model, domestic institutions often played advisory or supervisory roles rather than leading implementation.

As stabilization progressed and governance structures gradually developed, especially after 2000, more responsibilities were transferred to Bosnian authorities. Nevertheless, throughout the immediate post-war period, international actors particularly the OHR maintained executive authority over critical legislative and programmatic decisions, including those affecting reconstruction. The OHR enacted or amended property laws, monitored compliance, and imposed timelines for returns and evictions functioning as a hybrid of policymaker and enforcer (Belloni, 2001).

Despite the dominance of external actors, domestic input was not entirely absent. Bosnia retained a cohort of technically skilled professionals, particularly engineers and planners, many of whom were engaged in sectoral planning and implementation. Institutions such as the Bosnia and Herzegovina Road Directorate exemplified locally led project structures, supported by donor financing and technical oversight. However, ethnic mistrust and administrative fragmentation frequently hindered inter-entity collaboration. In response, donors often employed earmarked funding strategies, directing aid to specific ethnic constituencies or geographic zones to ensure political acceptability. While this approach mitigated tensions, it also produced inefficiencies,

PM World Journal (ISSN: 2330-4480)
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

such as duplicative programs across entity lines that might have been more effectively delivered through integrated national systems (The World Bank, 1998).

Corruption and accountability were additional focal points of stakeholder coordination. Post-conflict contexts often carry heightened risk of corruption due to weak institutional oversight and rapid aid inflows. In Bosnia, the proliferation of international contractors and NGOs created both opportunity and opacity in fund management. Although multilaterals and donors introduced safeguards such as international audits, procurement standards, and performance monitoring instances of misuse still occurred. The Housing Verification and Monitoring Unit (HVMU) was established to increase transparency and ensure that housing assistance was allocated equitably, with data systems used to track beneficiary selection and detect fraud (Jennett, 2007). While such mechanisms improved oversight, they also underscored the persistent limitations of local governance in the absence of fully empowered and accountable national institutions.

PM World Journal *(ISSN: 2330-4480)*
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

Figure 17. Early Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Stakeholder Coordination in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1996–1999)"

PM World Journal (ISSN: 2330-4480)
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

5.3. Operational Challenges and Solutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Post-conflict reconstruction in Bosnia and Herzegovina unfolded under conditions of profound operational complexity. More than half of the country's housing stock sustained varying degrees of damage, with major urban centers such as Sarajevo and Mostar experiencing extensive destruction due to sustained shelling (World Bank, 1997). Key infrastructure (i.e. roads, bridges, utility networks, etc.) was either severed or severely degraded, particularly across ethnically divided areas, impeding mobility, economic recovery, and equitable service delivery. The widespread presence of landmines added further complications, posing serious threats to reconstruction personnel and severely limiting agricultural and transport activities (Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining & United Nations Development Programme, 2022).

Despite these challenges, Bosnia retained certain logistical advantages. As part of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, it inherited a relatively skilled workforce, including trained engineers and construction professionals. This industrial legacy enabled local firms to contribute meaningfully to reconstruction, particularly in small- and medium-scale projects. Donors recognized the efficiency and developmental benefits of engaging local contractors; however, in the immediate post-war period (1996–1997), many domestic firms lacked access to capital, equipment, and experience with international procurement standards. As a result, larger and more technically complex assignments were often contracted to foreign firms (Donais, 2005).

To manage limited resources and avoid redundancy, coordination mechanisms were essential. A notable example was the Electricity Sector Task Force, which coordinated efforts to restore the national power grid across former frontlines. This mechanism ensured geographic complementarity among donors and reduced the risk of overlapping interventions. In the housing sector, early coordination gaps led to inefficiencies such as ''overbuilding'' in locations where displaced persons did not return. The Reconstruction and Return Task Force (RRTF) addressed these issues by promoting a policy of ''secondary movement'' assistance. This operational strategy prioritized the reconstruction of homes belonging to individuals who were occupying properties of others, thereby facilitating dual returns and maximizing the social impact of each intervention, a practice summarized as ''reconstruct two houses for the price of one'' (Jansen, 2011).

Information management emerged as another critical area of operations. During the early stages of reconstruction, data on housing damage, returnee patterns, and municipal infrastructure needs were often incomplete or fragmented. Over time, centralized databases such as UNHCR's refugee return registry and the Housing Verification and Monitoring Unit (HVMU) provided more reliable data for planning and targeting purposes. These systems reflected a broader operational shift toward evidence-based project selection and beneficiary identification, aligning with operations management principles emphasizing data-informed decision-making (Jennett, 2007).

PM World Journal (ISSN: 2330-4480)
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

Nevertheless, inefficiencies persisted. Field evaluations, such as those by Cox (2001), highlighted a lack of overarching strategic coherence. The absence of a unified reconstruction framework led to piecemeal and reactive programming. The sheer number of autonomous actors operating with disparate mandates, timelines, and funding structures posed a significant barrier to long-term planning. Humanitarian NGOs, for instance, frequently operated on short one-year funding cycles, which were poorly aligned with the multi-year development strategies pursued by institutional donors.

Unlike other post-conflict contexts, Bosnia benefitted from relatively stable security conditions after 1995, due in large part to the presence of NATO-led peacekeeping forces (IFOR, later SFOR). These forces ensured physical security and created an enabling environment for reconstruction activities. Operational challenges were more often political than military. In some municipalities, local authorities resisted reconstruction efforts, especially those facilitating the return of minority populations. In such cases, the multi-stakeholder governance framework, particularly the coordination among international actors, proved instrumental. For example, when a mayor refused to authorize infrastructure projects benefitting minority returnees, the RRTF and OHR leveraged their mandates or donor conditionalities to enforce compliance. This combination of diplomatic leverage and operational coordination illustrates how multi-stakeholder frameworks could be used not only for project management but also to advance the broader objectives of peacebuilding and social reintegration (Chandler, 2000).

PM World Journal *(ISSN: 2330-4480)*
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

Figure 18. Operational Complexity in Post-War Reconstruction: Bosnia and Herzegovina's Challenges and Responses (1996–1999)

5.4.   Outcomes and Evaluation of Bosnia's Multi-Stakeholder Approach

Bosnia and Herzegovina's post-conflict reconstruction yielded mixed but overall significant results, particularly in terms of rapid physical recovery and humanitarian achievements. Within the first five years following the Dayton Peace Agreement, notable progress was made across several key sectors:

- By 2000, most war-damaged electricity and telecommunications infrastructure had been restored, essential roads and bridges reopened, and the majority of schools and hospitals repaired and returned to functional status.
- Under the guidance of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the country introduced a new currency and implemented fiscal reforms that curbed hyperinflation and stabilized the macroeconomic environment.

PM World Journal (ISSN: 2330-4480)
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

- More than one million displaced persons and refugees had returned to their pre-war homes by the mid-2000s including to areas where they were ethnic minorities. This was a particularly significant milestone, made possible by the combined efforts of reconstruction programs and legal mechanisms for property restitution. By 2004, the vast majority of registered property claims had been resolved, an achievement viewed as exceptional given the volume of cases and initial political resistance.

These accomplishments were made possible through an intricate multi-stakeholder coordination effort. No single institution could have delivered these results independently. The convergence of UNHCR's technical expertise, the political leverage of the Office of the High Representative (OHR), donor financing, and local administrative compliance was instrumental especially in the challenging domains of housing reconstruction and refugee return. This underscores a core principle of post-conflict recovery: multi-stakeholder partnerships, when effectively coordinated, can deliver outcomes that exceed the capacity of any single actor operating alone.

However, several limitations emerged. Most notably, economic recovery lagged behind physical reconstruction. Despite the restoration of key infrastructure, unemployment remained stubbornly high—particularly among youth and returnees. Many of those who returned were elderly, while younger populations tended to remain abroad or migrate to economically more promising areas. Consequently, some reconstructed villages were left economically unsustainable, with housing units either vacant or only seasonally occupied. This disconnect between housing reconstruction and broader economic planning reflects a narrow, technically driven approach. As noted by field practitioner Marcus Cox (2001), housing interventions were often executed in isolation from livelihoods and development strategies. This critique later informed the articulation of the "three S" framework (space**,** security**,** and sustainability) as a more holistic model for return and reintegration.

Although coordination mechanisms improved over time, they were not without shortcomings. Sector task forces, donor consultations, and inter-agency meetings—while intended to facilitate alignment—could also generate bureaucratic inertia, delaying implementation decisions. Some local officials expressed dissatisfaction with the top-down nature of donor engagement, perceiving it as a bypassing of local ownership. This dynamic had implications for long-term institutional development: although infrastructure was rebuilt relatively quickly, the establishment of robust, self-sustaining governance systems progressed more slowly—a gap acknowledged in internal evaluations by the World Bank and other donors.

Nonetheless, one of the clearest lessons from Bosnia's experience is the critical importance of coordination in complex, multi-actor environments. While imperfect, the frameworks established through donor conferences, sector task forces, and the leadership of the World Bank and European Commission played an essential role in preventing project duplication, fostering division of labor, and promoting balanced aid distribution across sectors and geographic regions. These structures provided the institutional scaffolding necessary to manage a highly fragmented recovery landscape. In their absence, the risk of inefficiencies and inequitable outcomes would have been far greater.

PM World *Journal* (ISSN: 2330-4480)
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

From a governance perspective, the reconstruction process produced both promising and incomplete outcomes. Sectoral collaboration on technical issues such as infrastructure and utility restoration created neutral spaces for inter-ethnic cooperation, with some professional relationships forming across formerly hostile lines. However, these cooperative efforts did not necessarily translate into sustained political reconciliation. Despite the rebuilding of state institutions and democratic processes, the persistence of ethnonational fragmentation and political gridlock underscored the limits of technical reconstruction in addressing deeper structural and societal divisions.


Positive Outcomes

Physical and Humanitarian Gains
Electricity, roads, schools, and hospirals restored, af over one- million displaced persons retlin

Coordination and Partnerships
Multi-stakeholder colaboration facilitated housing and property restitution

Resolution of Property Claims
Majority of registered claims resolved through legal chann-

Limitations

Economic Challenges
High unemployment per- lack of planning left some villages econo- mically nonnviable

Coordination and Local Ownership
Bureaucratic processes slow decisions; excessive donor control limited local capacity

Political Fragmentation
Inter-ethnic cooperation did not translate into sustan- political reconciliation

Figure 19. Outcomes and Limitations of Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Bosnia and Herzegovina

PM World Journal (ISSN: 2330-4480)
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

5.5.   Summary

Bosnia and Herzegovina's reconstruction was a large-scale, internationally coordinated enterprise that achieved significant progress in infrastructure rehabilitation and humanitarian objectives, particularly in supporting refugee return. The case highlights both the potential and the limitations of multi-stakeholder coordination in a politically fragmented and institutionally fragile post-conflict environment. Coordination mechanisms though often bureaucratic and complex—were indispensable for organizing substantial flows of aid, avoiding duplication, and ensuring balanced coverage across sectors and regions.

However, the predominance of international actors, while effective in mobilizing resources and enforcing peace implementation, came at the expense of local ownership and the organic development of national institutions. This external dominance often translated into a technocratic approach to reconstruction, with insufficient integration between physical rebuilding and broader economic revitalization. As a result, critical gaps emerged such as the reconstruction of housing in economically unsustainable areas underscoring the need for more holistic and context-sensitive planning.

Ultimately, Bosnia's experience underscores that multi-stakeholder collaboration can deliver important short-term gains, but its capacity to support sustainable, locally owned recovery hinges on several key factors: the distribution of authority among stakeholders, the inclusiveness and transparency of planning processes, and the degree to which reconstruction goals are aligned with long-term development strategies and institutional capacity building.

6. Comparative Analysis of Rwanda and Bosnia and Herzegovina

6.1.   Overview

A comparative examination of the post-conflict reconstruction experiences of Rwanda and Bosnia and Herzegovina offers valuable insights into how contextual variables shape the design and outcomes of multi-stakeholder project management in fragile settings. Both cases underscore the essential role of multi-actor engagement including national governments, international donors, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and local communities—in restoring governance functions, rebuilding infrastructure, and promoting social recovery in the aftermath of violent conflict (de Coning, 2007; Barakat & Waldman, 2013).

However, the institutional arrangements and stakeholder dynamics employed in each country diverged sharply, resulting in markedly different trajectories. Rwanda adopted a highly centralized, state-led model, where the government asserted control over donor coordination and embedded external assistance within national planning frameworks (Hayman, 2009). This model emphasized national ownership, coherence, and grassroots participation through mechanisms such as Single Project Implementation Units (SPIUs) and programs like *Ubudehe* (UNDP, 2008). In contrast, Bosnia and Herzegovina's reconstruction unfolded under a fragmented and externally dominated architecture, where international actors such as the Office

PM World *Journal* *(ISSN: 2330-4480)*
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

of the High Representative (OHR), the World Bank, and the European Commission led most coordination and policy design functions due to limited domestic capacity and a politically decentralized peace settlement (Caplan, 2005; Chandler, 2006).

These divergent configurations reflected structural differences in political authority, institutional legitimacy, and the nature of conflict termination. Rwanda's military victory allowed for centralized authority and coherent strategic planning, while Bosnia's negotiated peace agreement institutionalized ethnic power-sharing and constrained unified state leadership (Bose, 2002; Paris, 2004). Consequently, Rwanda's reconstruction experience is often cited for its relative speed, coordination, and sustainability, while Bosnia's experience reveals both the enabling role and long-term constraints of international stewardship in politically contested environments (Maresca, 2003; Donais, 2005).

Taken together, the two cases demonstrate that while post-conflict reconstruction consistently requires inclusive coordination and technical capacity, the effectiveness and sustainability of such efforts depend heavily on context-sensitive institutional design. Adaptive strategies that respond to the unique political, social, and administrative realities of each setting are essential for navigating common reconstruction challenges such as resource constraints, coordination burdens, and legitimacy deficits while maximizing long-term peacebuilding and state-building outcomes (Brinkerhoff, 2005; Rocha Menocal, 2011).

Figure 20. Comparative Analysis of Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Rwanda and Bosnia and Herzegovina

PM World *Journal* (ISSN: 2330-4480)
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

6.2.   Governance Context and Leadership

One of the most salient contrasts between the post-conflict reconstruction experiences of Rwanda and Bosnia and Herzegovina lies in the locus of leadership and authority. In Rwanda, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)-led government asserted strong national ownership from an early stage. It articulated a clear reconstruction vision and progressively brought donor and NGO activities into alignment with national development priorities. This top-down coordination model was enabled by a relatively secure post-conflict environment: by the late 1990s, the RPF had consolidated territorial control and effectively suppressed insurgent threats, thereby creating the political space necessary for strategic state-led reconstruction planning. In this context, the government played a central role not only in policy formulation but also in operational coordination, introducing mechanisms such as Sector Working Groups and Single Project Implementation Units (SPIUs) to institutionalize stakeholder alignment and strengthen execution capacity.

In contrast, Bosnia and Herzegovina's reconstruction was initially driven by the international community, reflecting the country's profound internal political fragmentation and limited central governance capacity following the 1992–1995 war. The Dayton Peace Agreement, while effective in ending hostilities, institutionalized ethnonational divisions through a power-sharing arrangement that significantly diluted central authority. As a result, international actors—most notably the Office of the High Representative (OHR), along with key donors and multilateral institutions assumed surrogate leadership roles. These entities not only financed but also designed and implemented much of the early reconstruction agenda. Domestic institutions were relegated to supporting roles, constrained by both capacity deficits and political mistrust. Although local ownership improved incrementally in the 2000s, international oversight structures remained influential, often shaping the pace and direction of institutional reform.

The implications of these divergent leadership models are significant. In Rwanda, centralized national ownership facilitated more streamlined decision-making, reduced duplication of effort, and clarified accountability structures. Stakeholders including bilateral and multilateral donors – operated with the clear understanding that the government was the principal authority, fostering coherence and minimizing conflict among externally funded initiatives. In Bosnia, by contrast, fragmented domestic ownership and the absence of a unified national vision meant that, without continuous international coordination, stakeholder activities risked becoming fragmented or aligned with ethnically defined political agendas. Although international leadership helped maintain strategic focus and mitigate political obstruction, it also risked undermining local capacity and accountability, reinforcing patterns of external dependency rather than fostering sustainable domestic leadership for long-term reconstruction.

PM World Journal (ISSN: 2330-4480)
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

Dimension	Rwanda	Bosnia and Herzegovina
Leadership Model	Government-led, centralized under Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)	Internationally led, especially by the Office of the High Representative (OHR)
Post-Conflict Political Context	Stable, with RPF consolidating control and suppressing threats	Deeply fragmented, with ethnonational divisions and weak central institutions
Ownership of Reconstruction	Strong domestic ownership; government aligned and directed donor activities	Limited early domestic ownership; international actors set priorities and led coordination
Coordination Mechanisms	Sector Working Groups; Single Project Implementation Units (SPIUs)	Sector Task Forces; Joint Needs Assessment; Reconstruction and Return Task Force (RRTF)
Role of Donors and NGOs	Integrated into national frameworks under government leadership	Led much of planning and execution; Bosnian institutions often had consultative roles
Accountability Structure	Clear and centralized—government was the principal authority	Diffuse and externally driven—shared between OHR, donors, and fragmented local authorities
Implications	Streamlined planning, strong coherence, reduced duplication, clear responsibility	Risk of fragmentation, parallel systems, and dependency; slower transition to local control

Table 01. Leadership and Authority in Post-Conflict Reconstruction

6.3.   Stakeholder Inclusion and Participation

Another key point of divergence between the post-conflict reconstruction experiences of Rwanda and Bosnia and Herzegovina lies in their respective approaches to stakeholder inclusion. While both countries adopted forms of multi-stakeholder engagement, the design, function, and political character of these processes differed significantly.

Rwanda's model can be characterized as inclusive but centrally orchestrated. The Rwandan government engaged a broad spectrum of external partners—including bilateral donors, multilateral agencies, and international NGOs and promoted community-based participatory mechanisms through programs such as *Ubudehe* and *Imidugudu*. However, these inclusive practices unfolded within a tightly controlled policy framework dominated by strong central leadership. The primary objective of inclusion was to integrate external assistance into a nationally defined development agenda and to reinforce state–citizen relations at the grassroots level. Decision-making authority remained concentrated in central institutions, which coordinated donor activities to ensure alignment with national strategies such as Vision 2020 and the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS). As such, Rwanda's

PM World Journal (ISSN: 2330-4480)
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

multi-stakeholder model was fundamentally technocratic in orientation, emphasizing coherence, efficiency, and strategic control within a centralized governance structure.

By contrast, Bosnia and Herzegovina's stakeholder inclusion was pluralistic and deeply political. The governance architecture established by the Dayton Peace Agreement mandated ethnically balanced power-sharing, resulting in a highly decentralized system composed of multiple overlapping layers of government. Stakeholder coordination thus involved not only international donors and implementing agencies but also a fragmented set of domestic actors representing different ethnic constituencies across state, entity, cantonal, and municipal levels. In this context, international institutions such as the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) played a mediating role, balancing competing claims over resources and ensuring formal adherence to inclusive governance principles. Inclusion in Bosnia was therefore not merely a matter of development effectiveness but a central mechanism of peacebuilding and conflict management, a tool to promote political equilibrium and mitigate inter-ethnic tensions.

These contrasting logics of inclusion produced distinct operational outcomes. In Rwanda, the absence of rival political centers following the RPF's military victory enabled the consolidation of a technocratic consensus around state-led priorities. Stakeholder forums served primarily as instruments of coordination, not negotiation. In Bosnia, by contrast, coordination mechanisms often doubled as arenas of political contestation, where donor decisions had to accommodate ethnopolitical sensitivities and ensure balanced geographic and demographic distribution of aid. Thus, while both countries exemplified multi-stakeholder collaboration, Rwanda's approach was instrumental and state-centric, whereas Bosnia's was deliberative, externally mediated, and shaped by the imperatives of power-sharing and post-conflict reconciliation.

PM World Journal (ISSN: 2330-4480)
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

Dimension	Rwanda	Bosnia and Herzegovina
Inclusion Model	Inclusive but centrally guided	Pluralistic and politically mediated
Primary Driver of Inclusion	Technocratic integration of aid within a national development strategy	Political balance and peace consolidation across ethnic divisions
Stakeholder Landscape	Government, bilateral and multilateral donors, NGOs, local communities	Ethnically based local authorities, international donors, NGOs, multilateral organizations
Role of the State	Strong leadership; state retained control over coordination and strategic direction	Fragmented; state roles divided across competing ethnic and administrative entities
Role of International Actors	Integrated into national systems under state direction	Dominant in mediation and coordination; often led or substituted for state institutions
Coordination Mechanisms	Government-led forums; programs like Ubudehe and Imidugudu	Sector task forces, OHR and OSCE mediation, ethnically inclusive donor allocation
Purpose of Inclusion	Effectiveness, coherence, and grassroots legitimacy	Conflict mitigation, equitable distribution, and political stabilization
Resulting Dynamic	Technocratic and centralized	Negotiated, contested, and politically sensitive

Table 02. Stakeholder Inclusion in Post-Conflict Reconstruction

6.4. Coordination Mechanisms

A further point of contrast between Rwanda and Bosnia and Herzegovina lies in the structure and institutionalization of coordination mechanisms. Both countries implemented multi-layered frameworks to manage the complexity of post-conflict reconstruction, but the locus of authority, degree of integration, and long-term sustainability of these mechanisms diverged significantly.

In Rwanda, coordination was progressively internalized within the state apparatus. The government developed and institutionalized a system of sector working groups chaired by relevant line ministries and supported by donor representatives. This model culminated in the establishment of Single Project Implementation Units (SPIUs), which were embedded within ministries and tasked with managing all donor-funded projects in a given sector. These arrangements enabled the central government to maintain oversight over external assistance while building implementation capacity across the public sector. Coordination became not only a tool for aid alignment but also a core administrative function of the state, routinized through national planning and budgeting processes. This approach was made possible by Rwanda's relatively cohesive and disciplined public administration and its strong central leadership, which could enforce compliance and drive institutional reform. As a result, Rwanda's coordination

mechanisms were sustainable and domestically anchored, supporting long-term ownership and systemic integration.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, by contrast, coordination was primarily externally driven and designed to function within a short- to medium-term horizon. In the immediate post-war period, coordination was orchestrated by international actors through a network of sector task forces and specialized bodies such as the Reconstruction and Return Task Force (RRTF), often chaired or co-chaired by donor agencies or the Office of the High Representative (OHR). These platforms proved effective during the emergency and early recovery phases, facilitating donor alignment and managing politically sensitive issues such as refugee return. However, they operated largely outside the formal state apparatus, reflecting the limited capacity and fragmentation of Bosnia's post-Dayton governance structure. As international agencies gradually scaled down their involvement, coordination functions were transferred—often unevenly and with limited effectiveness to domestic institutions that lacked the authority, cohesion, or technical expertise to sustain them.

This contrast illustrates a fundamental difference in institutional trajectory. Rwanda's model embedded coordination within the machinery of the state, reinforcing national ownership and administrative continuity. In Bosnia, coordination was a function of international stewardship, essential in the early post-conflict period but difficult to sustain in the absence of robust domestic structures. While Bosnia's externally-led approach was arguably appropriate given the immediate governance vacuum and ethnic fragmentation, it struggled to transition into a self-sustaining model of public sector coordination. Thus, Rwanda's coordination architecture contributed to broader state-building objectives, whereas Bosnia's was largely confined to the logic of peace implementation effective in the short term, but less resilient over time without continued international involvement.

PM World Journal (ISSN: 2330-4480)
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

Dimension	Rwanda	Bosnia and Herzegovina
Coordination Ownership	Internally driven by national government	Externally driven by international actors
Primary Coordination Structures	Sector Working Groups, Single Project Implementation Units (SPIUs) integrated into ministries	Donor-led Task Forces, Reconstruction and Return Task Force (RRTF), OHR-led mechanisms
Locus of Coordination	Within the state apparatus	Outside core domestic institutions
Institutional Integration	Fully embedded in public administration	Parallel to state institutions; limited integration
Leadership of Coordination	Government ministries chaired coordination mechanisms	International actors (e.g., OHR, World Bank, UN agencies) chaired or co-chaired mechanisms
Capacity Building Role	Strengthened domestic administrative systems and national ownership	Mixed; supported short-term delivery but often bypassed domestic capacity building
Sustainability	High—coordination institutionalized into national governance structures	Low to moderate—coordination mechanisms dependent on continued international presence
Strategic Orientation	Long-term alignment with national development agenda	Short- to medium-term focus on post-conflict recovery and peace implementation
Function of Coordination	Tool of state-building and governance consolidation	Instrument of peace enforcement and emergency response

Table 03. Coordination Mechanisms in Post-Conflict Reconstruction

6.5. Project Execution and Operations

Operational effectiveness was a central concern in both Rwanda and Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly in the immediate aftermath of conflict when quick-impact projects were critical to restoring basic services and rebuilding public confidence. Although both countries implemented emergency reconstruction initiatives, the operational contexts and mechanisms for overcoming constraints differed markedly, shaped by variations in geography, governance structures, and political fragmentation.

In Rwanda, the country's small geographic size and highly centralized governance enabled relatively streamlined operational execution. Once primary transport routes were cleared and basic infrastructure was reestablished, the movement of goods, personnel, and materials proceeded with minimal bureaucratic or political obstruction. A unified command structure allowed for decisive and coordinated action, particularly following the introduction of centralized oversight mechanisms such as the Central Public Investments and External Finance Bureau (CEPEX) and later Single Project Implementation Units (SPIUs). These bodies allowed the

PM World *Journal* (ISSN: 2330-4480)
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

government to direct and align donor activity across sectors and territories, reducing delays and minimizing redundancy.

By contrast, Bosnia and Herzegovina faced significant operational constraints stemming from its territorial fragmentation and ethnically divided governance architecture. Post-conflict Bosnia was composed of two semi-autonomous entities and numerous subnational units, each with varying degrees of cooperation and capacity. Infrastructure projects such as power lines, water systems, and transportation networks – often traversed multiple administrative jurisdictions, requiring complex inter-entity negotiations over technical standards, financing, and execution timelines. Even demining operations demanded coordination among diverse military and political actors, often mediated by international organizations such as the Office of the High Representative (OHR) or the UN Mine Action Centre.

Bosnia's sector task forces, established to improve coordination and reduce fragmentation, provided important cross-entity forums for planning and collaboration. However, their consensus-based design while inclusive sometimes slowed implementation, particularly when stakeholder priorities clashed or trust was low. Rwanda, in contrast, benefited from a single decision-making hierarchy, which facilitated rapid planning and execution, particularly once project implementation was centralized within the public sector.

In both countries, the early post-conflict period was marked by duplication and inefficiency, largely due to a proliferation of uncoordinated actors. In Rwanda, international NGOs initially operated in a fragmented manner, leading to uneven geographic service coverage. These inefficiencies were progressively addressed through assertive government intervention, including the establishment of centralized oversight bodies that coordinated the allocation of donor-funded initiatives. Similarly, Bosnia experienced overlap among donors and implementers, which was mitigated through the introduction of information-sharing platforms, donor conferences, and OHR-led coordination that established a de facto division of labor.

Over time, both countries achieved incremental improvements in operational coordination and effectiveness, though through divergent institutional pathways. Rwanda's state-led, centralized model minimized fragmentation by integrating external actors into a national planning framework. Bosnia relied more heavily on externally facilitated collaboration among fragmented domestic stakeholders, with international actors playing a pivotal role in brokering consensus and enforcing standards.

These contrasts underscore how operational coordination in post-conflict environments is deeply influenced by governance configurations, political context, and institutional capacity. Rwanda's experience demonstrates the operational advantages of unified authority in a post-conflict state with a strong central government, while Bosnia highlights the complexities—and adaptive solutions- required in divided societies undergoing externally mediated reconstruction.

PM World Journal (ISSN: 2330-4480)
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

Dimension	Rwanda	Bosnia and Herzegovina
Geographic and Political Context	Small, compact territory with unified national authority	Fragmented territory with complex political and administrative divisions
Governance Structure	Centralized, strong executive control (RPF-led)	Decentralized and divided governance under the Dayton Peace Agreement
Project Implementation Model	Unified, state-led with central oversight (e.g., SPIUs)	Multi-actor, consensus-based with international mediation (e.g., Task Forces co-chaired by donors)
Initial Operational Constraints	Infrastructure disruption; NGO fragmentation	Inter-entity political obstacles; lack of harmonized standards; mined territory
Response to Duplication	Central government enforced coordination and project alignment (via CEPEX, SPIUs)	International actors introduced coordination forums; OHR enforced division of labor
Speed of Decision-Making	Fast, due to centralized authority and streamlined procedures	Slower, due to multi-stakeholder negotiation and political mistrust
Role of International Actors	Supportive but subordinate to government coordination structures	Dominant in coordination and enforcement; key mediators between fragmented local stakeholders
Evolution Over Time	Increased efficiency and state capacity; institutionalization of coordination	Gradual improvements through donor-led systems; long-term challenges in local ownership and continuity
Operational Strengths	Coherence, scalability, and clear accountability	Broad donor participation; cross-entity forums facilitated some reconciliation through joint planning
Operational Limitations	Risk of over-centralization; limited checks on government discretion	Slow implementation; dependency on external leadership; sustainability risks as international presence waned

Table 04. Operational Effectiveness in Post-Conflict Reconstruction

PM World Journal *(ISSN: 2330-4480)*
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

6.6. Local Capacity and Sustainability

A critical distinction between Rwanda and Bosnia and Herzegovina lies in the emphasis placed on local capacity building during the reconstruction process. Rwanda adopted a deliberate and early strategy of empowering domestic institutions and subnational governance structures. This included training civil servants, decentralizing project implementation to district authorities, and integrating donor-funded activities into national systems through mechanisms such as the Single Project Implementation Units (SPIUs). Over time, this approach enabled Rwanda to develop a robust institutional foundation capable of managing a significant share of its development agenda independently, thereby reducing reliance on external technical assistance for routine governance and public administration functions.

In contrast, Bosnia and Herzegovina's trajectory of capacity development was more delayed and externally mediated. In the immediate post-war years, reconstruction was largely carried out by international actors or through parallel implementation structures, limiting opportunities for domestic institutional learning and ownership. While Bosnian professionals were involved in selected sectors, the broader reconstruction process was often executed for Bosnia rather than in partnership with it. As international engagement tapered off, many domestic institutions remained underprepared to assume full responsibility for complex governance and development functions. This institutional fragility is reflected in the enduring presence, albeit reduced, of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and in Bosnia's ongoing reliance on external mediation to implement politically sensitive reforms.

This contrast underscores a critical lesson for post-conflict reconstruction: while externally managed efforts may deliver rapid short-term results, they do not necessarily foster sustainable or locally embedded outcomes. The World Bank's own reflection, that Bosnian authorities ''appreciated the sense of ownership'' when involved in project design and implementation aligns with the Rwandan experience, where ownership was assertively claimed and institutionalized from the outset. Rwanda's insistence that donors align with nationally defined priorities fostered both strategic coherence and local capacity development, whereas Bosnia's deferred localization process hampered the durability of reforms. Taken together, these cases illustrate that early and consistent investment in local capacity is not only crucial for legitimacy and accountability, but also for ensuring that reconstruction gains are sustained once international engagement recedes.

PM World Journal (ISSN: 2330-4480)
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

Dimension	Rwanda	Bosnia and Herzegovina
Approach to Capacity Building	Proactive, state-led investment in institutional and local government capacity from early stages	Delayed, largely externally driven with limited early engagement of domestic institutions
Implementation Structures	Integrated into national systems (e.g., SPIUs, decentralized district-level implementation)	Often executed through parallel, international-led structures (e.g., PIUs staffed by foreign experts)
Role of Local Institutions	Central role in planning, execution, and coordination of reconstruction projects	Limited involvement initially; gradually increased but often remained subordinate to international oversight
Donor Alignment	Donors required to align with national priorities and systems	Donors maintained significant autonomy; alignment often mediated by international coordinators (e.g., OHR)
Skill Transfer and Training	Focused on civil service training and long-term administrative strengthening	Sporadic and fragmented; often lacked continuity and alignment with national institutional development goals
Sustainability of Capacity	Increasingly self-reliant public sector with reduced need for external technical assistance	Continued dependence on international expertise; institutional reforms struggled without external facilitation
Symbol of Ownership	Strong assertion of ownership from the outset—"Help us do what we want to do"	Ownership often perceived as nominal or procedural rather than substantive
Long-Term Outcomes	Institutionalization of development management; durable systems integrated into governance	Fragile institutions; difficulty sustaining reforms post-donor withdrawal; ongoing reliance on international mediation

Table 05. Local Capacity Building in Post-Conflict Reconstruction

6.7.   Outcome Efficacy

Both Rwanda and Bosnia and Herzegovina succeeded in achieving the primary objectives of post-conflict reconstruction, particularly in restoring physical infrastructure and basic service delivery. However, the depth and trajectory of their respective recovery processes diverged significantly. Rwanda's reconstruction evolved into a transformational development agenda, marked by notable advances in governance, institutional performance, and public service delivery, many of which surpassed pre-conflict baselines. In contrast, Bosnia's recovery, while effective in meeting immediate post-war needs, including infrastructure rehabilitation, refugee return, and administrative reconstruction stagnated once these short-term goals were achieved. Long-term

PM World Journal (ISSN: 2330-4480)
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

transformation, particularly in areas such as economic sustainability and political reconciliation, remained largely unrealized.

This divergence in outcomes is, at least in part, attributable to the structure and coherence of the multi-stakeholder frameworks employed in each case. Rwanda's relatively unified stakeholder environment anchored by a strong, directive national government, enabled the pursuit of comprehensive and system-wide reforms. Initiatives such as community-based health insurance, performance contracts (Imihigo) in the public sector, and national education reforms were advanced through tight coordination between the government and development partners, fostering both technical innovation and policy cohesion.

In contrast, Bosnia and Herzegovina's multi-stakeholder model, while instrumental in delivering critical reconstruction outputs, proved less conducive to policy transformation. The country's fragmented political architecture and persistent ethno-political divisions inhibited stakeholder alignment and often stalled major reforms, particularly those requiring cross-entity cooperation. Efforts in economic restructuring and governance reform were frequently undermined by inter-entity gridlock or divergent donor agendas. As a result, Bosnia's coordination structures though essential for managing logistical complexity and balancing post-conflict sensitivities, lacked the integrative momentum required for deep, systemic change.

This comparison highlights a broader implication: multi-stakeholder coordination is a necessary but not sufficient condition for transformative post-conflict recovery. Its long-term effectiveness depends critically on the cohesion of leadership, the alignment of stakeholder interests, and the degree of local ownership. While some limitations, particularly in Bosnia's case-stem from unresolved political tensions that extend beyond the reconstruction domain, the Rwandan experience illustrates how a coherent, nationally anchored coordination strategy can support not only recovery but also institutional renewal and developmental transformation.

PM World Journal (ISSN: 2330-4480)
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

Dimension	Rwanda	Bosnia and Herzegovina
Reconstruction Outcome	Transitioned from recovery to transformational development	Effective immediate recovery, but limited long-term transformation
Physical Infrastructure & Services	Rapid restoration and continuous improvement beyond pre-conflict levels	Infrastructure and services restored to pre-war levels
Governance and Institutional Reform	Strong improvements: centralized leadership enabled systemic reforms (e.g., Imihigo, health insurance)	Fragmented authority hindered cohesive reform; political deadlock impeded transformation
Stakeholder Environment	Unified under strong national leadership; tight donor alignment	Highly fragmented; coordination managed by external actors
Multi-Stakeholder Coordination	Instrumental in enabling reforms and policy cohesion	Useful for logistics and conflict sensitivity, but limited strategic impact due to political fragmentation
Long-Term Development Path	Evolved into a development state with strong institutional performance	Plateaued after early reconstruction; ongoing political divisions and limited economic restructuring
Local Ownership	High; government dictated terms of aid alignment and implementation	Moderate to low; international actors led strategy, limiting deep local engagement or ownership
Transformational Impact	High: demonstrated institutional innovation and systemic change	Limited: systemic transformation stalled; reform progress inconsistent

Table 06. Trajectories and Outcomes of Post-Conflict Reconstruction

6.8. Challenges and Risks

Both Rwanda's and Bosnia and Herzegovina's reconstruction strategies involved inherent risks tied to the structure of their respective stakeholder coordination models. In Rwanda, the centralized, state-led approach facilitated developmental gains but also raised concerns about authoritarian consolidation. The government's tight control over coordination mechanisms created a governance environment in which civil society actors operated largely within state-defined parameters, limiting space for dissent and political pluralism. This underscores a key tension between efficiency and inclusiveness: while Rwanda achieved policy coherence and effective aid utilization, it did so at the potential cost of democratic openness.

By contrast, Bosnia and Herzegovina's externally orchestrated and pluralistic model carried the risk of dependency, accountability diffusion, and declining reform momentum. The fragmented

PM World *Journal* (ISSN: 2330-4480)
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

domestic leadership allowed local actors to deflect responsibility onto international agencies, while international actors, constrained by mandates and shifting priorities, often lacked long-term ownership of governance outcomes. As external engagement waned, so too did coordination effectiveness, contributing to developmental stagnation and unfulfilled institutional reforms in the post-reconstruction period.

This comparative analysis underscores that while multi-stakeholder approaches are indispensable in post-conflict recovery, their effectiveness depends on the presence of clear leadership, institutionalized coordination structures, and alignment with broader societal and developmental objectives. Rwanda illustrates the strengths of nationally anchored coordination, where international actors were integrated into clearly articulated strategic frameworks. Bosnia's experience, by contrast, highlights both the possibilities and pitfalls of externally led coordination in contexts of deep political fragmentation.

From these cases, several cross-cutting insights emerge for scholars and practitioners:

- Effective coordination mechanisms, such as Rwanda's Single Project Implementation Units (SPIUs) and Bosnia's sector task forces, are essential for minimizing duplication, fostering synergy, and enabling sector-wide planning.
- Inclusive participation, whether through community-based programs or consultative platforms, enhances local ownership, legitimacy, and project sustainability.
- The integration of reconstruction with longer-term peacebuilding and social reintegration objectives is vital for ensuring durable impact beyond infrastructure or service delivery.
- Above all, coordination is not a peripheral support function but a core managerial and political task, requiring the same rigor and attention as budgeting, technical design, or implementation logistics.

In sum, stakeholder coordination in post-conflict settings is a strategic endeavour—not merely a matter of administrative efficiency, but one that shapes the trajectory of national recovery. Its design and execution influence whether reconstruction lays the foundation for resilient peace and inclusive development, or merely restores a fragile, unsustainable status quo.

PM World Journal (ISSN: 2330-4480)
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

| Aspect	Rwanda	Bosnia and Herzegovina
Coordination Model	Centralized, government-led	Externally driven, pluralistic
Primary Risk	Authoritarian consolidation; limited political pluralism	Local disempowerment; dependency on international actors; weak accountability
Civil Society Role	Operates within state-defined parameters; constrained political space	More open, but fragmented; often dependent on international support
Accountability Structure	Clear government ownership of outcomes	Diffused across multiple actors; "blame shifting" between international and local actors
Coordination Mechanisms	Institutionalized (e.g., SPIUs, sector working groups) within national governance	Temporarily effective (e.g., task forces, RRTF), but not deeply embedded in state structures
Long-Term Coordination Trajectory	Sustained and integrated into national governance	Declined as international attention waned; limited domestic takeover
Strategic Strength	Alignment of donor efforts with national vision; efficient and coherent implementation	Balanced aid distribution across ethnic lines; effective short-term logistical coordination
Key Vulnerability	Trade-off between efficiency and political inclusiveness	Fragile sustainability due to external dependency and lack of unified domestic ownership
Lessons for Practice	Strong state orchestration can yield transformative outcomes if checks and balances are maintained	Coordination must be gradually localized and embedded to avoid dependency and promote sustainable governance
Broader Implication	Coordination is a strategic governance function, essential to long-term development and peacebuilding	Without domestic leadership and integration, coordination risks reinforcing a fragile status quo

Table 7. Risks and Strategic Implications of Stakeholder Coordination

PM World Journal (ISSN: 2330-4480)
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

7. Discussion

7.1. Broader Insights and Lessons Learned

Drawing on the comparative analysis of Rwanda and Bosnia and Herzegovina—as well as insights from the broader literature several overarching lessons emerge concerning the practice of post-conflict project management within multi-stakeholder frameworks. While specific outcomes are inherently shaped by contextual factors such as political settlement structures, institutional capacity, and the legacy of conflict, common principles can nonetheless be identified. These include the central importance of national leadership and ownership, the institutional design of coordination mechanisms, the value of inclusive participation, and the need to align reconstruction efforts with long-term development and governance objectives.

These insights contribute meaningfully to both the theoretical understanding of project management in fragile and conflict-affected contexts and the practical design of more effective reconstruction strategies. For international donors, national governments, and implementing agencies, the findings underscore that reconstruction is not merely a technical challenge, but a complex political and managerial endeavour. Ensuring sustainable impact requires more than delivering projects—it demands building systems, fostering trust, and navigating the institutional and societal terrain left in the wake of violent conflict.

PM World Journal (ISSN: 2330-4480)
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

Figure 21. Key Insights for Multi-Stakeholder Project Management in Post-Conflict Reconstruction

PM World Journal (ISSN: 2330-4480)
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

7.2.   Integrating Project, Public, and Operations Management Perspectives

The comparative cases of Rwanda and Bosnia and Herzegovina underscore that no single disciplinary lens is sufficient to navigate the complexity of post-conflict reconstruction. Rather, a multidisciplinary approach, drawing on the distinct but complementary contributions of project management, public management, and operations management, is essential. Project management offers structured methodologies for planning, monitoring, and delivering outputs; however, when applied in isolation, it risks reducing reconstruction to a series of technocratic interventions detached from broader governance dynamics. Public management contributes vital insights into stakeholder coordination, institutional strengthening, and policy coherence, ensuring that reconstruction efforts align with national priorities and bolster state legitimacy. Operations management brings a focus on logistical efficiency, adaptive execution, and systems thinking, critical in volatile post-conflict contexts marked by infrastructural degradation and resource constraints.

In Rwanda, this integrated approach was particularly evident: project management informed program design and delivery; public management guided centralized coordination and policy alignment; and operations management shaped pragmatic innovations such as the Single Project Implementation Units (SPIUs). In Bosnia, although more externally directed, similar patterns emerged: project management structured early infrastructure recovery; public management was exercised through surrogate institutions like the Office of the High Representative (OHR); and operations management principles shaped targeted interventions like the RRTF's housing ''return axes.''

These cases suggest that future post-conflict reconstruction should be deliberately interdisciplinary in its management structures. Effective teams should combine project managers, public sector governance experts, and logistics or operations specialists to ensure that reconstruction programs are technically sound, politically informed, and operationally viable. Such an approach is best equipped to meet the multidimensional demands of post-conflict recovery, where rebuilding roads, schools, and hospitals must occur alongside efforts to restore institutional legitimacy, social trust, and national resilience.

PM World Journal (ISSN: 2330-4480)
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

Figure 22. A Multidisciplinary Approach to Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Integrating Project, Public, and Operations Management

7.3. Stakeholder Coordination Mechanisms are Key Infrastructure

Just as roads and bridges are essential for reconnecting post-conflict societies physically, coordination infrastructure—including sector working groups, shared information systems, and dedicated liaison roles, is critical for reconnecting them institutionally. The function of such mechanisms is akin to reducing friction within a complex system: they enable more efficient allocation of resources, minimize duplication, and foster coherence across a diverse array of actors. Scholars have emphasized that without such coordination, reconstruction efforts often suffer from waste, inefficiency, and fragmentation. Both Rwanda and Bosnia and Herzegovina ultimately recognized this imperative and established coordination structures. In both cases, their absence in early phases, such as in Rwanda's fragmented health sector response or Bosnia's misaligned housing reconstruction, necessitated later corrective interventions.

A key lesson, therefore, is that coordination should be treated as a core operational priority, not a secondary administrative task. This requires early investment in the design and implementation of coordination systems, including the clear assignment of leadership roles, regular and structured coordination meetings, standardized data-sharing protocols, and

PM World Journal *(ISSN: 2330-4480)*
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

mechanisms to identify and resolve overlaps and gaps. In post-conflict environments where institutional capacity is often weak and stakeholder landscapes are highly fragmented; coordination infrastructure is not a bureaucratic overhead, it is a strategic enabler of effective and inclusive reconstruction.

Figure 23. Coordination Infrastructure as a Strategic Pillar in Post-Conflict Reconstruction

7.4. National Ownership VS. International Support – Finding the Balance

A recurring theme in post-conflict reconstruction is the need to strike a delicate balance between the provision of substantial international aid and the imperative of fostering national ownership. The ideal configuration, exemplified by Rwanda, is one in which capable and committed national leadership articulates a coherent reconstruction agenda, with international donors aligning their support accordingly. In such settings, external resources can be channelled through national systems in ways that reinforce, rather than displace, domestic governance and institutional development.

In other contexts, particularly where the state is fragmented, lacks legitimacy, or was a party to the conflict, an interim period of international stewardship may be necessary to stabilize governance and service delivery. Bosnia and Herzegovina illustrates that while international actors can play a crucial role in holding the reconstruction process together, long-term sustainability hinges on a deliberate and well-managed transition of authority to domestic institutions. Absent such a handover, local governance risks becoming structurally dependent and lacking in popular legitimacy.

PM World Journal *(ISSN: 2330-4480)*
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

This balancing act is equally relevant at the community level. Reconstruction initiatives must avoid two extremes: overly centralized, top-down approaches risk alienating beneficiaries and eroding local trust, while unstructured, bottom-up efforts may suffer from incoherence or limited scalability. The formulation advanced by UNDESA, ''national ownership and local involvement'', captures this dual imperative well: the state must retain strategic oversight, while communities must be genuinely engaged in shaping, implementing, and sustaining reconstruction outcomes.

Figure 24. Balancing International Support with National Ownership in Post-Conflict Reconstruction

7.5. Flexibility and Adaptation

Post-conflict environments are inherently dynamic, marked by fragile peace, shifting political landscapes, and evolving societal priorities as the focus transitions from emergency relief to long-term development. In such settings, multi-stakeholder project management must prioritize flexibility and adaptive capacity. International NGOs and development actors operating in these contexts should avoid rigid adherence to predetermined project designs, instead adopting approaches that remain responsive to changing ground realities.

Bosnia and Herzegovina offers a clear illustration of this principle. Early reconstruction initiatives operated on the assumption that physical rebuilding, particularly housing, would automatically catalyze refugee return. When this assumption proved only partially valid, stakeholders recalibrated their strategies by revising beneficiary selection criteria and integrating complementary livelihood interventions. Rwanda similarly demonstrated adaptive governance:

PM World *Journal* *(ISSN: 2330-4480)*
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

the government incrementally refined its coordination mechanisms, culminating in the establishment of Single Project Implementation Units (SPIUs) as a durable and effective institutional response to earlier fragmentation.

These cases underscore the practical imperative of embedding flexibility into reconstruction planning. Project frameworks and donor strategies should include structured review points, scenario-based contingency planning, and provisions for mid-course correction. Additionally, stakeholder coordination platforms, such as sector working groups, can function as adaptive management arenas, enabling real-time assessment, collaborative problem-solving, and shared learning in response to emerging challenges and opportunities.

Figure 25. Adaptive Project Management in Post-Conflict Settings: Balancing Structure with Flexibility

PM World Journal (ISSN: 2330-4480)

Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025

www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management

by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE

Featured Paper

7.6. Trust and Communication

Effective multi-stakeholder collaboration in post-conflict reconstruction is fundamentally contingent upon trust, an asset often depleted in societies emerging from violent conflict. Transparent communication and the early, meaningful inclusion of stakeholders in decision-making processes are essential to rebuilding this trust. Both Rwanda and Bosnia and Herzegovina provide instructive examples of mechanisms that fostered confidence and accountability.

In Bosnia, the Housing Verification and Monitoring Unit (HVMU) played a critical role in promoting fairness by publicly identifying cases of ''double occupancy,'' thereby reinforcing the integrity of aid allocation and discouraging opportunistic behavior. In Rwanda, joint sector performance reviews between the government and international donors served not only as evaluation tools but also as forums for mutual accountability and information-sharing, reinforcing collaborative norms. Furthermore, the strategic communication of early wins—such as the rapid reopening of schools or the restoration of water services—was instrumental in building public confidence and encouraging broader social cooperation.

Conversely, failures in communication or exclusionary practices can quickly erode trust. NGOs that operate without engaging local authorities' risk being perceived as unaccountable or externally imposed, while government actors may be viewed as obstructive or politically partial. To mitigate these risks, best practice calls for the institutionalization of communication and transparency mechanisms. These include shared information systems, public dashboards tracking aid flows and project implementation, and regular multi-stakeholder consultations at both national and community levels. Such tools not only enhance transparency but also pre-empt misalignment, reduce misinformation, and foster a shared sense of ownership over the reconstruction agenda.

Figure 26. Building Trust through Transparency and Inclusion in Post-Conflict Reconstruction

PM World Journal (ISSN: 2330-4480)
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

7.7.   Holistic and Inclusive Definitions of Success

Post-conflict reconstruction extends beyond the physical restoration of infrastructure; it is fundamentally about creating the conditions for sustainable peace and inclusive development. A multi-stakeholder approach, by virtue of incorporating diverse actors with varying mandates, expertise, and constituencies, enables a more holistic reconstruction agenda that addresses not only material needs but also social, economic, and institutional dimensions of recovery.

The case of unoccupied reconstructed homes in Bosnia and Herzegovina highlights the limitations of narrowly scoped interventions: physical rebuilding, absent parallel efforts in livelihood support, social reintegration, and local security, risks producing incomplete or unsustainable outcomes. By contrast, multi-stakeholder configurations, when strategically leveraged, can identify and address such interdependencies. For example, involving local entrepreneurs in the rebuilding of markets can surface complementary needs, such as access to finance, transport infrastructure, or regulatory clarity, that might otherwise be overlooked by technically focused actors.

Both Rwanda and Bosnia provide evidence that integrated, cross-sectoral approaches yield greater impact. In Rwanda, school reconstruction was embedded within broader education reform, including curriculum renewal, teacher training, and performance monitoring, ensuring that physical investments translated into functional public service delivery. In Bosnia, housing programs gradually evolved to incorporate legal enforcement of property rights, demining operations, and employment initiatives, crucial components for enabling durable refugee return and reintegration.

These cases underscore a key lesson: multi-stakeholder approaches are most effective when they pursue strategic synergy across sectors, aligning individual projects with broader peacebuilding and development goals. Integration, not fragmentation, must be the operative logic in designing and implementing post-conflict reconstruction initiatives.

PM World Journal (ISSN: 2330-4480)
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

Figure 27. Integrated Multi-Stakeholder Approaches to Post-Conflict Reconstruction

7.8. Challenges of Multi-Stakeholder Management

It is important to recognize that multi-stakeholder management in post-conflict settings is inherently complex and often fraught with challenges. Coordination can be slow and cumbersome, as it involves reconciling divergent institutional cultures, mandates, and operational logics. For example, the priorities and working methods of a military peacekeeping force may differ markedly from those of a humanitarian NGO or a local government agency. These differences can produce friction, and reconstruction efforts themselves may inadvertently exacerbate tensions, such as competition over resources, credit, or access to services.

In such environments, effective project managers often act as diplomats or mediators, navigating a terrain of competing interests, asymmetrical power dynamics, and varied accountability structures. The cases of Rwanda and Bosnia and Herzegovina vividly illustrate these dynamics. In Rwanda, friction occasionally arose between government authorities and NGOs perceived as insufficiently aligned with national strategies. In Bosnia, international donors themselves were sometimes at odds, debating, for instance, whether aid should be contingent on political reforms or allocated based strictly on humanitarian need.

PM World Journal (ISSN: 2330-4480)

Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025

www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management

by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE

Featured Paper

Addressing these tensions requires a systematic approach to stakeholder analysis, aimed at understanding the incentives, constraints, and influence of each actor. It also demands institutionalized mechanisms for negotiation and consensus-building. Tools such as Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) between governments and NGOs can clarify roles and expectations, while donor compacts and harmonized aid frameworks can reduce duplication, promote alignment, and foster collective accountability. Ultimately, managing complexity in post-conflict reconstruction is not just a technical challenge, but a political and relational one—requiring deliberate strategies to build trust, mediate differences, and sustain collaborative momentum.

Figure 28. Navigating Stakeholder Conflict in Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Aligning Diverse Interests and Operational Logics

PM World *Journal* (ISSN: 2330-4480)
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

7.9. Generalizability of Lessons

Although Rwanda and Bosnia and Herzegovina emerged from conflict under vastly different historical and institutional conditions, the insights derived from their reconstruction experiences resonate with trends observed in other post-conflict contexts, including Sierra Leone, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and South Sudan. Across these cases, multi-stakeholder approaches have become a defining feature of contemporary peacebuilding practice, as exemplified by global initiatives such as the United Nations' Delivering as One framework and the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States. These frameworks emphasize coherence, alignment, and national ownership, principles that this analysis confirms are essential for achieving sustainable and legitimate recovery. As policy literature consistently warns, fragmented interventions may yield visible short-term outputs, but they rarely result in lasting systemic transformation.

In conclusion, effective post-conflict project management requires an integrated approach that combines technical rigor with participatory governance. Projects must be efficiently designed and executed, yet embedded within broader frameworks that prioritize accountability, inclusiveness, and local ownership. Multi-stakeholder collaboration is rarely straightforward; it involves complex coordination, competing agendas, and significant transaction costs. However, when strategically managed, such arrangements enable actors to leverage complementary capacities and bridge institutional gaps. As demonstrated in both Rwanda and Bosnia, critical reconstruction objectives, whether national reintegration, institutional restoration, or the return of displaced populations, were only achievable through coordinated, multi-actor engagement.

Ultimately, the imperative to collaborate in post-conflict settings is not merely a normative aspiration, but a pragmatic necessity. In fragile environments where state capacity is constrained and needs are vast, multi-stakeholder coordination is indispensable, not just for rebuilding what was lost, but for laying the groundwork for durable peace, inclusive development, and resilient governance.

PM World Journal (ISSN: 2330-4480)
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

Figure 29. Integrated Principles for Effective Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Lessons from Rwanda, Bosnia, and Beyond

8. Conclusion

8.1. Overview

Post-conflict reconstruction represents one of the most intricate and demanding arenas in project management, requiring not only technical and logistical acumen but also the ability to navigate complex political environments and support processes of societal reconciliation. The inherently multifaceted nature of reconstruction in post-conflict settings demands a holistic, integrative approach—one that combines physical infrastructure restoration with institutional reform and meaningful community engagement.

This research has explored the pivotal role of multi-stakeholder frameworks in which national governments, international donors, NGOs, and local communities converge to meet the diverse challenges of post-conflict recovery. By integrating theoretical insights from project management, public administration, and operations management, and grounding the analysis in comparative case studies of Rwanda and Bosnia and Herzegovina two emblematic cases of

PM World Journal (ISSN: 2330-4480)
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

international post-conflict engagement, this study has identified the conditions under which collaborative reconstruction efforts are most likely to succeed.

The findings underscore the importance of adaptive planning, inclusive governance structures, and context-sensitive implementation strategies. From these cases, several overarching conclusions emerge, offering both conceptual insights and practical guidance for designing and managing reconstruction interventions in similarly fragile or transitional environments. These lessons contribute to a growing understanding of how strategic, multi-actor collaboration when properly coordinated—can transform short-term recovery efforts into pathways toward long-term peace and development.

Figure 30. Toward Holistic Reconstruction: Integrating Project, Public, and Operations Management in Post-Conflict Settings

PM World *Journal* (ISSN: 2330-4480)
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

8.2.   Coordination is Essential, Not Optional

The comparative experiences of Rwanda and Bosnia and Herzegovina demonstrate that multi-stakeholder coordination is not a peripheral concern, but a foundational pillar of effective post-conflict reconstruction. In contexts marked by institutional fragility, social fragmentation, and pressing developmental demands, no single actor, whether domestic or international—possesses the full legitimacy, resources, or operational capacity to meet the complex, interdependent challenges of recovery alone. Coordination thus emerges as a critical mechanism for aligning diverse mandates, harmonizing strategic priorities, and optimizing the allocation of financial and technical resources.

Rwanda's post-genocide recovery was shaped by a centralized, state-led coordination model that promoted policy coherence and minimized duplication across donor and NGO activities. This enabled the government to assert national ownership over the reconstruction process, integrating external support into a clearly defined development agenda. In contrast, Bosnia and Herzegovina's reconstruction relied heavily on international coordination mechanisms, including donor conferences, sectoral task forces, and the authority of the Office of the High Representative (OHR), which were necessary given the fragmented political settlement and ethnically divided governance landscape.

Despite their divergent institutional arrangements, both cases highlight that coordination is indispensable to translating aid and goodwill into concrete outcomes, such as displaced persons' return and reintegration, infrastructure rehabilitation, and the restoration of essential services. These findings affirm that coordination is not merely a technical function but a strategic one, a connective process that transforms high-level reconstruction objectives into actionable, context-specific interventions on the ground.

Figure 31. The Centrality of Coordination in Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Comparative Insights from Rwanda and Bosnia and Herzegovina

8.3. Ownership and Inclusive Must Be Balanced

The sustainability of post-conflict reconstruction outcomes fundamentally depends on achieving a calibrated balance between strong national ownership and broad-based, inclusive participation. While assertive national leadership is essential for articulating coherent policy frameworks, aligning donor support with domestic priorities, and asserting sovereignty over the reconstruction agenda, the meaningful inclusion of diverse societal stakeholders—including civil society organizations, marginalized groups, and local communities, is equally vital for fostering legitimacy, accountability, and long-term resilience.

Rwanda illustrates both the strengths and limitations of centralized governance in post-conflict recovery. The government's strong institutional capacity and disciplined coordination mechanisms enabled efficient donor alignment and expedited implementation, driving notable progress in sectors such as health, education, and infrastructure. However, this top-down model has faced criticism for constraining civil society engagement and limiting pluralistic discourse

PM World Journal *(ISSN: 2330-4480)*
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

elements widely recognized as foundational to inclusive development and democratic deepening.

In contrast, Bosnia and Herzegovina's reconstruction initially lacked strong local ownership, with international actors—particularly the Office of the High Representative (OHR), playing a directive role in shaping policy and institutional reform. While this externally led model contributed to post-war stabilization and early governance reconstitution, it also weakened domestic accountability and fostered institutional dependency. Over time, Bosnia incrementally shifted toward more participatory structures, incorporating local stakeholders into planning and fostering indigenous capacity.

Comparative practice and emerging scholarship suggest that the most resilient reconstruction frameworks are those that combine assertive national leadership with institutionalized stakeholder participation. Instruments such as joint steering committees, participatory planning platforms, and multi-tiered coordination bodies help mediate competing interests, enhance transparency, and build responsive governance. By embedding both top-down authority and bottom-up inclusivity, hybrid models are best positioned to deliver reconstruction outcomes that are not only technically sound but also socially legitimate and politically sustainable.

Figure 32. Balancing National Ownership and Inclusive Participation in Post-Conflict Reconstruction

8.4. Operational Efficiency Enhances Impact

Operational effectiveness constitutes a critical dimension of post-conflict reconstruction, especially in contexts where acute logistical constraints, institutional fragility, and urgent humanitarian and development needs converge. In such settings, the translation of strategic goals into timely and effective action is often impeded by fragmented governance, capacity deficits, and fluid security conditions. Accordingly, the design and execution of operational systems must prioritize agility, efficiency, and responsiveness.

Empirical cases such as Rwanda and Bosnia and Herzegovina underscore the value of operational innovation in improving service delivery and overcoming implementation bottlenecks. In Rwanda, the introduction of Single Project Implementation Units (SPIUs) within line ministries helped consolidate donor-funded initiatives under unified management structures reducing duplication, enhancing oversight, and ensuring alignment with national priorities. In Bosnia, the use of emergency procurement mechanisms in the immediate aftermath of war enabled the rapid mobilization of goods and services, thereby facilitating reconstruction despite the absence of fully functional state institutions.

The incorporation of principles from operations management, including supply chain coordination, dynamic resource allocation, real-time performance monitoring, and adaptive planning—has proven particularly effective in such environments. These tools allow reconstruction actors to optimize limited resources, manage interdependencies, and adapt to shifting on-the-ground realities. By embedding operational flexibility into institutional frameworks, post-conflict reconstruction efforts can enhance not only their efficiency, but also the resilience needed to sustain progress amid persistent volatility and uncertainty.

PM World Journal (ISSN: 2330-4480)
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

Figure 33. Enhancing Operational Effectiveness in Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Lessons from Rwanda and Bosnia and Herzegovina

8.5.   Reconstruction is inherently Political and Social

While the reconstruction of physical infrastructure often serves as the most visible marker of post-conflict recovery, sustainable peace ultimately hinges on the deeper, more enduring processes of institutional and social reconstruction. Roads, schools, and hospitals are necessary, but not sufficient. Durable recovery requires the restoration of legitimate governance, the reweaving of social cohesion, and the reconstitution of a shared civic identity. In this regard, multi-stakeholder frameworks play a pivotal role, not simply in coordinating resources, but in embedding principles of political legitimacy, accountability, and social inclusion into the very architecture of reconstruction.

The experiences of Rwanda and Bosnia and Herzegovina illustrate the importance of such integrative approaches. In Rwanda, post-genocide reconstruction was guided by a strong emphasis on national unity and inclusive socioeconomic development, explicitly aimed at preventing a recurrence of ethnic violence. Initiatives such as the *Ubudehe* participatory planning framework and Gacaca community justice system were designed not only to rebuild services and infrastructure, but to promote reconciliation and reinforce collective ownership of the recovery process.

Bosnia and Herzegovina, by contrast, pursued post-war reconstruction through institutional reform and minority return, positioning these as central strategies for reversing ethnic cleansing

PM World Journal (ISSN: 2330-4480)

Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025

www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management

by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE

Featured Paper

and fostering a multi-ethnic democratic order. Supported by international actors, efforts such as property restitution, refugee repatriation, and constitutional restructuring under the Dayton framework sought to rebuild not only the state's physical capacity, but also its normative foundations, particularly the principles of interethnic coexistence and representative governance.

In both cases, the success of reconstruction efforts cannot be judged solely by technical metrics or immediate outputs. Their enduring impact rests on whether they contribute to rebuilding public trust, fostering intergroup cooperation, and reinforcing inclusive governance structures. By aligning operational execution with broader goals of social healing and institutional legitimacy, multi-stakeholder reconstruction efforts can meaningfully advance the consolidation of peace and the prevention of renewed conflict.

Figure 34. Beyond Infrastructure: Linking Physical Reconstruction with Institutional Legitimacy and Social Cohesion

8.6.   Managing Stakeholders Requires Skill and Strategy

Post-conflict reconstruction environments involving multi-stakeholder engagement are inherently complex, often characterized by overlapping mandates, divergent priorities, and latent or overt tensions among participating actors. In such contexts, project management transcends its traditional technical scope and becomes a deeply political and relational endeavour. Project managers are tasked not only with ensuring the timely and efficient delivery of outputs, but also with navigating the institutional interests, organizational cultures, and normative frameworks of a diverse stakeholder constellation, including national governments, international donors, NGOs, multilateral institutions, and local communities.

PM World Journal *(ISSN: 2330-4480)*
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

This expanded role demands not only operational competence but also diplomatic agility, informed by rigorous stakeholder analysis and proactive, strategic communication. The cases of Rwanda and Bosnia and Herzegovina underscore how friction can emerge at multiple levels, between central governments and international NGOs over control and accountability; among donors over policy alignment and burden-sharing; or across ethnic and political divisions where historical grievances remain unresolved. If left unaddressed, these tensions can fragment reconstruction efforts, erode trust, and compromise both effectiveness and legitimacy.

To mitigate such risks, institutionalized coordination and conflict-resolution mechanisms are essential. Tools such as Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs), donor compacts, sector-wide approaches (SWAps), and inter-agency coordination platforms can clarify roles, align expectations, and create structured forums for dialogue and joint decision-making. By formalizing collaboration and promoting transparency, these mechanisms reduce ambiguity, foster mutual accountability, and cultivate the relational infrastructure required to manage complexity in fragile settings. In this way, stakeholder management evolves from a supporting function into a foundational pillar of inclusive and effective reconstruction governance.

Figure 35. Stakeholder Management in Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Navigating Complex Actor Dynamics

PM World **Journal** *(ISSN: 2330-4480)*
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

8.7. Lessons for Future Reconstruction Efforts

The post-conflict reconstruction trajectories of Rwanda and Bosnia and Herzegovina align closely with global best practices now codified in international frameworks such as the United Nations' Delivering as One initiative and the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, championed by the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding. These frameworks emphasize coordinated, country-led approaches grounded in inclusive governance, adaptability, and mutual accountability, principles that are clearly reflected, in both success and shortfall, across the Rwandan and Bosnian experiences.

Both cases reaffirm a central insight: effective reconstruction is not solely about the technical delivery of infrastructure or services, but about embedding these efforts within participatory, transparent, and context-responsive governance. The presence, or absence of robust coordination mechanisms significantly shaped the coherence, legitimacy, and sustainability of recovery outcomes. Coordination, therefore, must be understood not as an administrative afterthought, but as a core institutional asset—as critical as roads, clinics, or schools to rebuilding a resilient post-conflict state.

Moreover, stakeholder trust is not automatic; it must be intentionally cultivated through inclusive engagement, clearly defined roles, and sustained dialogue. Mechanisms such as sectoral working groups and multi-stakeholder steering committees enable joint planning, shared monitoring, and adaptive learning essential functions in environments characterized by volatility and complexity. Equally important is the integration of flexibility into program design: rigid, linear project models often falter in the face of shifting political dynamics or emerging societal needs. Adaptive programming—anchored in real-time feedback and continuous consultation with local actors is vital to ensuring both relevance and resilience.

In sum, the comparative experiences of Rwanda and Bosnia and Herzegovina underscore a foundational principle of post-conflict reconstruction: the convergence of technical competence with inclusive, adaptive governance is not a luxury, it is a prerequisite for durable peace and development. Where these elements are aligned, multi-stakeholder frameworks can transcend transactional coordination to become transformative vehicles for institutional renewal and societal healing.

PM World *Journal* (ISSN: 2330-4480)

Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025

www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management

by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE

Featured Paper

Figure 36. Institutionalizing Best Practices: Global Norms in Post-Conflict Reconstruction

8.8.   Final Reflection

Ultimately, post-conflict reconstruction must be understood not merely as a technical or logistical exercise, but as a fundamentally political and developmental process—one that engages with the reconstruction of national identity, institutional legitimacy, and the social contract. At its core, it is a nation-building endeavour. The adoption of multi-stakeholder approaches reflects the inherent complexity of this task, recognizing that no single actor possesses the full authority, resources, or perspective necessary to confront the multifaceted challenges that emerge in the aftermath of violent conflict.

When grounded in clear leadership, inclusive participation, and disciplined coordination, multi-stakeholder frameworks can transform short-term recovery initiatives into enduring platforms for societal renewal. The cases of Rwanda and Bosnia and Herzegovina, despite their divergent governance architectures and political trajectories, both affirm this potential. Rwanda's centralized, state-led model and Bosnia's internationally mediated, pluralist reconstruction framework each demonstrate that collaborative engagement across institutional boundaries is

PM World Journal (ISSN: 2330-4480)
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

not only advantageous but essential for sustaining peace, rebuilding trust, and enabling equitable development.

In this light, multi-stakeholder project management should be regarded not as an auxiliary component of post-conflict programming, but as a foundational pillar of successful reconstruction. It is through coordinated, inclusive, and adaptive partnerships that war-torn societies can navigate the path from crisis to resilience—and from fragmented recovery to cohesive and sustainable peacebuilding.

Figure 37. Multi-Stakeholder Reconstruction as a Pillar of Post-Conflict Nation-Building

References

Apte, A. (2010). *Humanitarian logistics: A new field of research and action*. *Foundations and Trends® in Technology, Information and Operations Management*, **3**(1), 1–100. https://doi.org/10.1561/0200000014

Autesserre, S. (2010). *The trouble with the Congo: Local violence and the failure of international peacebuilding*. Cambridge University Press.

Barakat, S., & Waldman, T. (2013). Conflict analysis for the twenty-first century. *Conflict, Security & Development, 13*(3), 259–283. https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2013.811048

Barakat, S., & Zyck, S. A. (2009). The evolution of post-conflict recovery. *Third World Quarterly, 30*(6), 1069–1086. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40388300

Barnett, M., Kim, H., O'Donnell, M., & Sitea, L. (2007). Peacebuilding: What is in a name? *Global Governance*, *13*(1), 35–58. http://www.jstor.org/stable/27800641

Barnett, M. (2012). The Golden Fleece: Manipulation and Independence in Humanitarian ActionAntonio Donini (ed.). *International Review of the Red Cross*, *94*(887), 1169–1172. doi:10.1017/S1816383113000210

Beamon, B. M., & Balcik, B. (2008). Performance measurement in humanitarian relief chains. *International Journal of Public Sector Management*, *21*(1), 4–25. https://doi.org/10.1108/09513550810846087

Belloni, R. (2001). Civil society and peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina. *Journal of Peace Research, 38*(2), 163–180. http://www.jstor.org/stable/425493

Berman, S. (2007). Case studies and theory development in the social sciences. *Perspectives on Politics, 5*(1), 187–188. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592707070491

Blatter, J., & Haverland, M. (2012). Designing case studies: Explanatory approaches in small-N research (ECPR Research Methods). Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137016669

Booth, D. (2012). *Development as a collective action problem: Addressing the real challenges of African governance* (APPP Synthesis Report). Overseas Development Institute (ODI). Retrieved June 22, 2025, from https://cdn.odi.org/media/documents/appp-synthesis-report-development-as-a-collective-action-problem-david-booth-o_7un7DOu.pdf

Booth, D., & Golooba-Mutebi, F. (2012). Developmental patrimonialism? The case of Rwanda. *African Affairs, 111*(444), 379–403. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41494508

PM World Journal (ISSN: 2330-4480)
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

Bose, S. (2002). *Bosnia after Dayton: Nationalist partition and international intervention*. Oxford University Press.

Bowen, G. A. (2009). Document analysis as a qualitative research method. *Qualitative Research Journal, 9*(2), 27–40. https://doi.org/10.3316/QRJ0902027

Brinkerhoff, J. M. (2002). Government–nonprofit partnership: A defining framework. *Public Administration and Development, 22*(1), 19–30. https://doi.org/10.1002/pad.203

Brinkerhoff, D. W. (2005). Rebuilding governance in failed states and post-conflict societies: Core concepts and cross-cutting themes. *Public Administration and Development, 25*(1), 3–14. https://doi.org/10.1002/pad.352

Brinkerhoff, D. W. (2007). *Capacity development in fragile states* (Discussion Paper No. 58D). European Centre for Development Policy Management. Retrieved June 22, 2025, from https://ecdpm.org/application/files/5616/5547/2722/DP-58D-Capacity-Development-in-Fragile-States-2007.pdf

Brinkerhoff, D. W. (2008). Developing capacity in fragile states. *Public Administration and Development, 28*(1), 13–24. https://doi.org/10.1002/pad.545

Burg, S. L., & Shoup, P. S. (1995). *The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic conflict and international intervention* (1st ed.). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315704494

Call, C. T. (2008). Building states to build peace? A critical analysis. *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development, 4*(2), 60–74. https://www.jstor.org/stable/48603002

Caplan, R. (2005). *International governance of war-torn territories: Rule and reconstruction*. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/0199263450.001.0001

Chandler, D. (2000). *Bosnia: Faking democracy after Dayton* (2nd ed.). Pluto Press. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt18fs8w9

Chandler, D. (2006). *Empire in denial: The politics of state-building*. Pluto Press. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt18fs393

Chemouni, B. (2014). Explaining the design of the Rwandan decentralization: Elite vulnerability and the territorial repartition of power. *Journal of Eastern African Studies, 8*(2), 246–262. https://doi.org/10.1080/17531055.2014.891800

Chesterman, S. (2004). *You, the people: The United Nations, transitional administration, and state-building*. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/0199263485.001.0001

PM World Journal (ISSN: 2330-4480)
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

Colletta, N. J., Cullen, M., & Mendelson Forman, J. (1998, April 20–21). *Conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction: Perspectives and prospects* (Workshop report, World Bank Paris Office). World Bank. Retrieved June 23, 2025, from https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/241911468198561613/conflict-prevention-and-post-conflict-reconstruction-perspectives-and-prospects

Conforto, E. C., Salum, F., Amaral, D. C., da Silva, S. L., & de Almeida, L. F. M. (2014, June/July). Can agile project management be adopted by industries other than software development? *Project Management Journal, 45*(3), 21–34. https://doi.org/10.1002/pmj.21410

Cornwall, A. (2008). Unpacking "participation": Models, meanings and practices. *Community Development Journal, 43*(3), 269–283. https://doi.org/10.1093/cdj/bsn010

Cox, M. (2001, January). *State building and post-conflict reconstruction: Lessons from Bosnia*. International Conflict Research Project, ETH Zurich. Retrieved June 23, 2025, from https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/102385/2001_01_State_Building_and_Post-Conflict_Reconstruction.pdf

Crawford, P., & Bryce, P. (2003). Project monitoring and evaluation: A method for enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of aid project implementation. *International Journal of Project Management, 21*(5), 363–373. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0263-7863(02)00060-1

Curtis, D. (2002, April 1). *Politics and humanitarian aid: Debates, dilemmas and dissension* (HPG Report 10). Humanitarian Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute. Retrieved June 22, 2025, from https://odi.org/en/publications/politics-and-humanitarian-aid-debates-dilemmas-and-dissension/

de Coning, C. (2007). *Coherence and coordination in United Nations peacebuilding and integrated missions: A Norwegian perspective* (Report). Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. Retrieved June 22, 2025, from https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/46185/2007_Coherence_Coordination_UN_Peacebuilding.pdf

del Castillo, G. (2008). *Rebuilding war-torn states: The challenge of post-conflict economic reconstruction*. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199237739.001.0001

Denzin, N. K. (2009). *The research act: A theoretical introduction to sociological methods* (5th ed.). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315134543

PM World Journal (ISSN: 2330-4480)
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

Donais, T. (2005). *The political economy of peacebuilding in post-Dayton Bosnia* (1st ed.). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203003268

Donais, T. (2009). Inclusion or exclusion? Local ownership and security sector reform. *Studies in Social Justice, 3*(1), 117–131. https://doi.org/10.26522/ssj.v3i1.979

Feinstein International Center. (2006). *Humanitarian Agenda 2015: Principles, power, and perceptions: Preliminary report*. Tufts University. https://fic.tufts.edu/wp-content/uploads/HA2015-Preliminary-Report-1.pdf

Focus International. (2000). *Results-Based Management in Development Co-operation: An overview of key concepts, definitions and issues* (RBM005-1886527). Focus International. Retrieved June 22, 2025, from https://focusintl.com/RBM005-1886527.pdf

Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining & United Nations Development Programme. (2022, June 2). *The sustainable development outcomes of mine action in Bosnia and Herzegovina* [Report]. GICHD & UNDP. Retrieved June 23, 2025, from https://www.gichd.org/publications-resources/publications/the-sustainable-development-outcomes-of-mine-action-in-bosnia-and-herzegovina/

Gerring, J. (2007). *Case study research: Principles and practices*. Cambridge University Press.

Gready, P. (2010). *The era of transitional justice: The aftermath of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa and beyond* (1st ed.). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203841938

Grindle, M. S. (Ed.). (1997). *Getting good government: Capacity building in the public sectors of developing countries*. Harvard Institute for International Development, Harvard University.

Grindle, M. S. (2004). Good enough governance: Poverty reduction and reform in developing countries. *Governance, 17*(4), 525–548. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0952-1895.2004.00256.x

Hayman, R. (2009). From Rome to Accra via Kigali: "Aid effectiveness" in Rwanda. *Development Policy Review, 27*(5), 581–599. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7679.2009.00460.x

Hickey, S., & Mohan, G. (Eds.). (2004). *Participation: From tyranny to transformation? Exploring new approaches to participation in development* (Illustrated, reprinted ed.). Zed Books.

PM World Journal (ISSN: 2330-4480)
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

Ika, L. A. (2012). Project management for development in Africa: Why projects are failing and what can be done about it. *Project Management Journal, 43*(4), 27–41. https://doi.org/10.1002/pmj.21281

Ika, L. A., & Donnelly, J. (2017). Success conditions for international development capacity building projects. *International Journal of Project Management, 35*(1), 44–63. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2016.01.003

International Monetary Fund. (2013). *Rwanda: 2012 Article IV Consultation and Fifth Review under the Policy Support Instrument and Request for Modification of Assessment Criteria* (IMF Country Report No. 13/77). International Monetary Fund. Retrieved June 22, 2025, from https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2016/12/31/Rwanda-2012-Article-IV-Consultation-and-Fifth-Review-under-the-Policy-Support-Instrument-and-40416 gov.uk+10imf.org+10imf.org+10

Istrefi, R. (2017). Transitional justice and reconciliation from the international peace-building perspective. *SEER: Journal for Labour and Social Affairs in Eastern Europe, 20*(2), 269–287. http://www.jstor.org/stable/26427185

Jansen, S. (2011). Refuchess: Locating Bosniac repatriates after the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. *Population, Space and Place, 17*(2), 140–152. https://doi.org/10.1002/psp.607

Jennett, V. (2007). *Tackling corruption in post-conflict situations* (U4 Helpdesk Answer). Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute. Retrieved June 23, 2025, from https://www.u4.no/publications/tackling-corruption-in-post-conflict-situations.pdf

Kapucu, N., & Van Wart, M. (2006). The evolving role of the public sector in managing catastrophic disasters: Lessons learned. *Administration & Society, 38*(3), 279–308. https://doi.org/10.1177/0095399706289718

Kettl, D. F. (2002). *The transformation of governance: Public administration for twenty-first century America*. Johns Hopkins University Press.

Kovács, G., & Spens, K. M. (2007). Humanitarian logistics in disaster relief operations. *International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management, 37*(2), 99–114. https://doi.org/10.1108/09600030710734820

Le Billon, P. (2000, July). *The political economy of war: What relief agencies need to know* (HPN Network Paper 33). Overseas Development Institute. Retrieved June 22, 2025, from https://odihpn.org/wp-content/uploads/2000/07/networkpaper033.pdf

Lindemann, S. (2008). *Do inclusive elite bargains matter? A research framework for understanding the causes of civil war in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Crisis States Discussion Paper No. 15). Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science. Retrieved June 23, 2025, from https://www.lse.ac.uk/international-development/Assets/Documents/PDFs/csrc-discussion-papers/dp15-Do-Inclusive-Elite-Bargains-Matter.pdf oecd.org+4lse.ac.uk+4omerjournal.com+4

Mac Ginty, R. (2011). *International peacebuilding and local resistance: Hybrid forms of peace* (Rethinking Peace and Conflict series). Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230307032

Mac Ginty, R., & Richmond, O. P. (2013). The local turn in peace building: A critical agenda for peace. *Third World Quarterly, 34*(5), 763–783. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2013.800750

Maresca, J. J. (2003). The role of the private sector in post-conflict reconstruction. *Refugee Survey Quarterly, 22*(4), 161–164. http://www.jstor.org/stable/45054747

Ministère des Gouvernements Locaux. (n.d.). *Plan stratégique du secteur Gouvernance et Décentralisation*. Retrieved June 22, 2025, from https://www.minaloc.gov.rw/index.php?eID=dumpFile&f=17774&t=f&token=ababb955dcd82cf8c816cd735eae5a15220ba20d&utm_source=chatgpt.com

Mosse, D. (2005). *Cultivating development: An ethnography of aid policy and practice*. Pluto Press. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt18fs4st

National Research Council. (2007). *Science and technology for Army homeland security: Report of a workshop on pre- and post-conflict situations* (Report 1). National Academies Press. Retrieved June 23, 2025, from https://nap.nationalacademies.org/catalog/10655/science-and-technology-for-army-homeland-security-report-1 nap.nationalacademies.org+4nap.nationalacademies.org+4ncbi.nlm.nih.gov+4

OECD. (2005). *Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness*. OECD Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264098084-en

OECD. (2008). *Concepts and dilemmas of state building in fragile situations: From fragility to resilience*. *OECD Journal on Development, 9*(3), 61–148. https://doi.org/10.1787/journal_dev-v9-art27-en OECD. (2011). *Supporting statebuilding in situations of conflict and fragility: Policy guidance.* OECD Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264074989-en

PM World Journal (ISSN: 2330-4480)
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

Oloruntoba, R., & Gray, R. (2006). Humanitarian aid: An agile supply chain? *Supply Chain Management: An International Journal, 11*(2), 115–120. https://doi.org/10.1108/13598540610652492

Paris, R. (2004). *At war's end: Building peace after civil conflict*. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511790836

Paris, R., & Sisk, T. D. (Eds.). (2009). *The dilemmas of statebuilding: Confronting the contradictions of postwar peace operations* (1st ed.). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203884836

Patton, M. Q. (2015). *Qualitative research & evaluation methods: Integrating theory and practice* (4th ed.). SAGE Publications.

Pouligny, B. (2006). *Peace operations seen from below: UN missions and local people*. Hurst.

Pugh, M. (2005). The political economy of peacebuilding: A critical theory perspective. *International Journal of Peace Studies, 10*(2), 23–42. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41852928

Purdeková, A. (2011). 'Even if I am not here, there are so many eyes': Surveillance and state reach in Rwanda. *The Journal of Modern African Studies, 49*(3), 475–497. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X11000292

Ramalingam, B., Laric, M., & Primrose, J. (2014, September 18). *From best practice to best fit: Understanding and navigating wicked problems in international development* (Working Paper). Overseas Development Institute. Retrieved June 23, 2025, from https://odi.org/en/publications/from-best-practice-to-best-fit-understanding-and-navigating-wicked-problems-in-international-development/

Rocha Menocal, A. (2011). State building for peace: A new paradigm for international engagement in post-conflict fragile states? *Third World Quarterly, 32*(10), 1715–1736. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2011.610567

Sakalasuriya, M. M., Haigh, R. P., & Amaratunga, D. (2016). *The consequences of post conflict reconstruction: A review of literature*. University of Huddersfield. Retrieved June 23, 2025, from https://pure.hud.ac.uk/files/40167292/ConsequencesPostConflict.pdf

Simchi-Levi, D., Kaminsky, P., & Simchi-Levi, E. (2003). *Designing and managing the supply chain: Concepts, strategies and case studies* (2nd ed.). McGraw-Hill/Irwin.

Stake, R. E. (2005). *Multiple case study analysis* (Illustrated ed.). Guilford Press.

Tomasini, R., & Van Wassenhove, L. (2009). *Humanitarian logistics* (1st ed.). Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230233485

PM World Journal (ISSN: 2330-4480)
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

Transparency International. (2022). *Corruption perceptions index 2022*. Transparency International. Retrieved June 23, 2025, from https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2022

Turner, J. R. (2008). *The handbook of project-based management: Leading strategic change in organizations* (3rd ed.). McGraw Hill Professional.

United Nations Development Programme. (2008). *Evaluation of Rwanda's Ubudehe programme*. UNDP. https://erc.undp.org/evaluation/documents/download/7341

United Nations Development Programme. (2009). *Capacity development: A UNDP primer*. United Nations Development Programme. Retrieved June 23, 2025, from http://content-ext.undp.org/aplaws_publications/2222263/CDG_PrimerReport_final_web.pdf

United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. (2007). *Creating an inclusive society: Practical strategies to promote social integration*. UNDESA. https://www.un.org/esa/socdev/egms/docs/2009/Ghana/inclusive-society.pdfUnited Nations. (2004). *A more secure world: Our shared responsibility (Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change).* United Nations.

United Nations. (2008). *United Nations peacekeeping operations: Principles and guidelines (Capstone Doctrine)*. Department of Peacekeeping Operations & Department of Field Support, United Nations. Retrieved June 23, 2025, from https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/capstone_eng_0.pdf en.wikipedia.org+2peacekeeping.un.org+2peacekeeping.un.org+2

United Nations Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery. (2006). *Key propositions for building back better* [Report]. United Nations. Retrieved June 22, 2025, from https://www.humanitarianlibrary.org/sites/default/files/2014/02/UN_KeyPropositions4BuildingBackBetter.pdf

Van Wassenhove, L. N. (2006). Humanitarian aid logistics: Supply chain management in high gear. *Journal of the Operational Research Society, 57*(5), 475–489. https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jors.2602125

Whitfield, L. (Ed.). (2008). *The politics of aid: African strategies for dealing with donors*. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199560172.001.0001

The World Bank. (1997). *Bosnia and Herzegovina: From recovery to sustainable growth* (World Bank Country Study No. 16711). The World Bank. https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/682101468769460337/bosnia-and-herzegovina-from-recovery-to-sustainable-growth

PM World Journal (ISSN: 2330-4480)
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

The World Bank. (1998). *Post-conflict reconstruction: The role of the World Bank*. World Bank. Retrieved June 22, 2025, from https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/175771468198561613/post-conflict-reconstruction-the-role-of-the-world-bank

The World Bank Operations Evaluation Department. (2003). *Uganda: Post-conflict reconstruction* (Case Study). The World Bank. https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/721121468110674575

The World Bank. (2003). *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*. World Bank. Retrieved June 22, 2025, from https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/ce680d98-c240-5747-a573-b4896762e5f5/content

The World Bank. (2011). *Rapport sur le développement dans le monde 2011 : Conflits, sécurité et développement – Abrégé* [World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development – Summary]. World Bank. http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4389

Womack, J. P., & Jones, D. T. (2003). *Lean thinking*. Free Press.

Yin, R. K. (2018). *Case study research and applications: Design and methods* (6th ed.). Sage Publications.

PM World Journal (ISSN: 2330-4480)
Vol. XIV, Issue VII – July 2025
www.pmworldjournal.com

Post-War Project Management
by Prof. Dr. M.F. HARAKE
Featured Paper

About the Author

Prof. Dr. M. F. HARAKE

Bordeaux, France

Prof. Dr. M. F. HARAKE is a management professor based in France. He currently serves as the Assistant General Manager and Dean of Academic Affairs at MESOS Business School (France). In addition, he is the Manager of the Research Center at GBSB Global Business School (Malta). He is also affiliated as an Associate Research Fellow at the CEREGE Research Laboratory, University of Poitiers (France). Prof. Harake's research interests include Post-Conflict Public Management, Crisis and Urgent Operations Management, Humanitarian Logistics, and Project Management in Unstable Environments. His academic and professional contributions focus on bridging strategic theory with high-impact practical execution, especially in volatile and complex contexts.

He can be contacted at mfharake@mesos-bs.com